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How to Fix Legal Scholarmush 
ADAM J. KOLBER 
Legal scholars often fail to distinguish descriptive claims about what the law is from 
normative claims about what it ought to be. The distinction couldn’t be more 
important, yet scholars frequently mix it up, leading them to mistake legal authority 
for moral authority, treat current law as a justification for itself, and generally use 
rhetorical strategies more appropriate for legal practice than scholarship. As a 
result, scholars sometimes talk past each other, generating not scholarship but 
“scholarmush.”  
In recent years, legal scholarship has been criticized as too theoretical. When it 
comes to normative scholarship, however, the criticism is off the mark. We need more 
careful attention to theory, otherwise we’re left with what we have too much of now: 
claims with no solid normative grounding that amount to little more than opinions. 
We have no shortage of opinions, and simply producing more opinions will not make 
scholarship more practical.  
Of course, centuries-old disputes in jurisprudence have struggled to untangle the 
precise relationship between law and morality, but my message is simple: scholars 
must be more clear, transparent, and rigorous about which of their claims are 
descriptive and which are normative (and what sort of normativity is at issue). By 
being more precise, we can hope to stop talking past each other and develop more 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a vast conceptual difference between descriptive and normative claims about 
the law. Under a common view, descriptive claims about what the law is rely on legal 
sources such as cases, statutes, and regulations, and perhaps reasonable predictions 
about how judges and others will behave in the future. By contrast, normative claims 
about what we morally ought to do depend on more than just descriptive facts. They 
depend on values that cannot be deduced merely by empirical investigation. As a 
descriptive matter, a jurisdiction may criminalize insider trading, but that tells us 
little, if anything, about whether the conduct ought to be criminalized.1 Many laws 
have been morally atrocious, including statutes and decisions institutionalizing 
slavery, limiting women’s property rights, prohibiting interracial marriage, and         
so on.  
Yet the difference between the descriptive and the normative is frequently blurred 
or ignored by legal scholars. One scholar might say that a judge “should” deem the 
defendant’s conduct insider trading, while another might say that a judge “should 
not.” Though their views appear oppositional, they may agree on substance if one 
refers to a legal “should” (meant as an expression of the positive state of the law) and 
the other to a moral “should” (meant to be independent of the positive state of the 
law). Conversely, scholars may express agreement but actually hold antithetical 
views. We are left not with productive scholarly exchange but with scholarmush—a 
tangled combination of claims rooted partly in law and partly in morality that are 
partly dependent on facts and partly dependent on values. It’s time to untangle the 
scholarmush. 
Sometimes confusion arises not from the author but from misinterpretations of 
the author’s claims. For example, in 2010, Jason Mazzone wrote an op-ed in the New 
York Times containing descriptive claims (both historical and predictive) about a 
major then-upcoming Commerce Clause case in the Supreme Court.2 Afterward, 
according to Mazzone: 
[a]lmost without exception, the [law] professors who contacted me (or 
who wrote responses in other settings) expressed bewilderment, 
disappointment, even anger that in my op-ed I had “endorsed” the 
Commerce Clause challenge the plaintiffs were making to the individual 
mandate. I had, of course, done no such thing. All the op-ed did was 
explain why I thought the plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause arguments would 
have greater traction than other commentators were predicting and that a 
success for the government at the Supreme Court was far from certain.3  
 
 
 1. Cf. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 857, 860 (1983) (“For purposes of analyzing whether insider trading is 
beneficial or detrimental, nothing turns on whether a particular trade is illegal.”). 
2. Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You to Be Healthy?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/opinion/17mazzone.html [https://perma.cc 
/ZR3J-E365]. 
 3. Jason Mazzone, Obamacare and Problems of Legal Scholarship, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1265, 1269 (2014). 
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Perhaps the law professors Mazzone described confused descriptive and 
normative claims. Or perhaps they read the choice to defend a particular predictive 
claim as advocacy of a corresponding normative claim.4 Either way, as Mazzone tells 
the story, the scholarly community unnecessarily bogged itself down by 
misconstruing a brief op-ed. I will give several examples of claims in much longer, 
more detailed scholarship where similar misconstruals could easily occur. All of the 
examples come from excellent scholars writing in venues with more space to explain 
the normativity of their claims. 
Legal scholarship has been accused of being too theoretical.5 And there are, 
indeed, important questions about how much legal scholarship we should have and 
how much of it should be normative. But to the extent scholars write normative 
scholarship, the too-much-theory criticism is off the mark. We need more and better 
theory, otherwise we’re left with what we have now: normative claims with no solid 
theoretical grounding that may amount to little more than opinions. We have no 
shortage of those, and nothing could be less practical when searching for sound 
scholarly advice. Of course, centuries-old disputes in jurisprudence have struggled 
to untangle the relationship between law and morality, but my thesis is simple: 
scholars must be more clear, transparent, and rigorous about the extent to which their 




 4. Perhaps the tone of some of Mazzone’s sentences led some to think he endorsed his 
prediction. It is risky, however, to focus on tone rather than affirmative assertions.  
 5. Chief Justice John Roberts caused quite a stir, for example, when he said: 
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, 
you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th 
Century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the 
academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.  
Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds After Chief Justice Roberts Disses Legal 
Scholarship, ABA JOURNAL (July 7, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.abajournal.com 
/news/article/law_prof_responds_after_chief_justice_roberts_disses_legal_scholarship/ 
[https://perma.cc/7UCP-2NH4]; cf. Press Release, University of New Hampshire, Scalia’s 
Critique of Legal Education Echoes UNH Law’s Practice-Ready Philosophy (Mar. 25, 2013), 
https://law.unh.edu/news/2013/03/scalia%E2%80%99s-critique-legal-education-echoes-unh-
law%E2%80%99s-practice-ready-philosophy [https://perma.cc/5QNA-9VFP] (reporting 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s lament that legal scholarship has become increasingly esoteric and 
his belief that “[t]here’s not much more legal scholarship to be done”). Few complain that 
literary criticism produces insufficient practical advice for novelists, though literary criticism 
and legal scholarship are disanalogous in many ways. 
 6. By “clear” scholarship, I mean that it should be as simple to understand as is 
reasonably possible. “Transparent” scholarship is straightforward as to the claims it makes and 
upfront about conflicts of interest that might cloud factual assertions. “Rigor” is a shorthand 
term for qualities such as consistency, precision, comprehensiveness, and being well-
supported by facts and arguments. While I repeat these three scholarly qualities frequently, by 
no means do I denigrate other important scholarly virtues such as originality, elegance, and 
eloquence. Of course, all of these qualities can present tradeoffs among each other.  
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I. DESCRIPTION VERSUS MORAL NORMATIVITY 
Before turning to the distinction between descriptive and normative claims, we 
must first know what a piece of scholarship is claiming at all.  
A. Clear, Consistent Thesis 
Most scholarship requires a clearly stated thesis that summarizes the scholar’s 
central claim. The thesis may also contain subclaims, each of which contains more 
subclaims. But the overarching thesis sets up the author’s argumentative goal and 
gives us a hurdle by which to judge its success. Given that law review articles often 
exceed 25,000 words and that scholars read hundreds of them, a good thesis increases 
the chances of making a memorable contribution to the literature. It also adds 
accountability, making it harder to weasel out of opposing arguments by subtly 
shifting one’s claims.  
Too often, legal scholars seem happy simply to stew in topics they find 
interesting. They enjoy learning about new cases, reminding themselves about old 
ones, and playing around in the relevant issues. They treat an article’s thesis as an 
afterthought. I’ve often heard scholars fret about the most inconsequential details of 
their papers while their theses languish in obscurity. Yet qualities like clarity and 
rigor are not optional; they’re prerequisites of good scholarship.  
Faculty frequently workshop papers that lack clear theses. The first question to 
such speakers should simply be “what is your thesis?” Without a clearly stated thesis, 
it’s almost impossible to have a meaningful discussion. We cannot evaluate how well 
scholars achieved the aims they set for themselves without knowing what those aims 
were. 
Legal scholars frequently misjudge the quality of a piece of scholarship by 
focusing on whether they agree with its thesis. Agreement is largely irrelevant. We 
should focus on the rigor of a thesis,7 as well as the quality of the ideas and arguments 
that support it. And just as sports like diving have a difficulty component, so do 
theses. The more ambitious, difficult, and unlikely a thesis is, often the more 
impressive is the progress made to establish it. So, a somewhat weaker argument for 
a grand unifying theory could be more impressive than a careful, meticulous defense 
of an uninteresting or unoriginal point. Indeed, the paper that tries but fails to 
establish a grand claim may still make an important scholarly contribution by 
advancing the literature. Perhaps the next paper will fill in the gaps. But asking 
whether you agree with a thesis is a recipe for allowing idiosyncratic biases to infect 
assessments of quality.  
The quality of a piece of scholarship can be evaluated from a perspective that is 
either internal or external to its thesis. From an internal perspective, we ask whether 
 
 
 7. Soft theses about how one set of ideas “illuminates” another tend to be ambiguous 
and unfalsifiable. Almost any argument can illuminate another. For example, my student note 
argues that a rather radical idea is “at least worthy of further consideration.” Adam Kolber, 
Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 163, 167 (2001). It is not the worst claim of all time and may have been warranted 
given the unusual subject matter, especially at the time it was written. But the thesis would 
have been stronger had it been bolder and more easily subject to falsification.  
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the arguments in support of a thesis are consistent, plausible, and well supported. 
This analysis should be relatively objective, and because of that, the internal 
consistency of a thesis is one of the more reliable tests of quality.  
We can also evaluate scholarship from an external perspective: independent of 
the particular arguments made in the piece to defend it, is the thesis itself ambitious, 
interesting, and original? Similarly, some might ask how useful or practical a thesis 
is in addressing real-world problems. Both internal and external analyses are 
important, but external analysis is often less objective. Whether scholarship is 
interesting, for example, is probably more subjective than whether it is logically 
consistent.  
Legal scholars frequently underemphasize how well defended a thesis is (the 
internal perspective) and overemphasize the choice of a thesis (the external 
perspective). For example, scholars writing tenure letters will often summarize an 
article and then meekly complain that “there are several topics I wish the author had 
addressed.” Doing so often skips the most important question. Namely, how clear 
and well defended was the central argument of the paper? Reviewers often fail to 
state whether alleged omissions are problematic because inclusion is needed to 
defend the thesis or because the reviewer has different interests than those of the 
author. The first concern is of monumental importance: ignoring issues fundamental 
to a thesis can be tantamount to failure. But if an author and a reviewer merely share 
different interests, it may be of no consequence at all.  
In any event, because quality largely depends on how well scholarly writing 
achieves the aims it sets for itself, it needs a consistent, well-formed statement of 
those aims in the form of a thesis. A good thesis makes scholarship more clear, 
consistent, and rigorous. It can also make a piece more memorable and more likely 
to contribute to the literature.  
B. Descriptive Versus Normative Claims 
Armed with a clearly articulated thesis, we can more carefully examine the nature 
of the claim made in the thesis (and in the other arguments that support it). 
Descriptive claims address the way the world is, was, or will be. They concern 
features of the world that are, in principle, open to empirical observation—for 
example, “The envelope was postmarked January 16, 2016,” or “The number of 
people incarcerated in the United States has increased this year.”  
Historical and predictive claims are kinds of descriptive claims as well. Historical 
claims attempt to describe the way the world was—“Ada Lovelace was a 
mathematician”—while predictive claims attempt to describe the way the world will 
be—“It will rain on Sunday.” Even a false descriptive claim, “Medford is the capital 
of Massachusetts,” is still a descriptive claim. It seeks to describe facts about the 
world but fails in the process. In legal contexts, a claim that the Second Circuit 
reversed such-and-such decision would be historical, while a claim that the Second 
Circuit will reverse such-and-such decision would be predictive. But they are both 
descriptive claims. All of these claims speak to how the world is, was, or will be, 
while saying nothing about how it ought to be.  
Normative claims, by contrast, speak to how the world ought to be. They typically 
prescribe behavior or behavioral prohibitions. One might assert that “you should be 
kind to strangers” or that “you shouldn’t kick a sleeping dog.” In legal contexts, a 
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scholar might argue that “statutes prohibiting assisted suicide should be repealed.” 
These claims often contain words like “should” or “ought” that make or imply claims 
about what is morally good or bad. When legal scholars refer to “policy” arguments, 
I believe they are generally referring to what I call “moral” arguments. 
The line between descriptive and normative claims can sometimes be difficult to 
draw.8 If someone reports seeing a parent “cruelly” hit a child, the statement seems 
descriptive in some respects. It reports what the person observed. But it likely also 
contains a normative evaluation that the hitting was morally inappropriate. Similarly, 
our best scientific descriptions of the empirical world are not value-free. The way we 
observe the world is influenced by the theories we construct, and those theories 
depend on certain value judgments.9 The key for legal scholars is to be as clear as 
necessary given the context. If we mostly agree on what we mean by “cruelly,” then 
not a lot of explication is necessary. But if there is a risk of confusion, more explicit 
discussion along the descriptive/normative divide is helpful. 
Unless otherwise noted, when I speak of normativity, I refer to moral normativity. 
By contrast, people sometimes speak of norms of fashion, humor, or good manners. 
Whatever such norms refer to, they do not refer to the sort of thing that, for example, 
makes you a morally good or bad person or gives you serious obligations to conform. 
I suspect that the vast majority of “normative” legal scholarship is intended to be 
morally normative, or at least has morally normative components. (In Section II.B.4, 
I discuss the important difference between legal and moral normativity.)  
C. Why the Distinction Is So Important 
The distinction between descriptive and normative claims is so important because 
they make very different kinds of assertions about the world that must be tested in 
very different ways. If we disagree about a descriptive claim, we can usually go out 
into the world, examine the pertinent facts, and try to figure out the truth. If you 
disagree with my descriptive claim that “Hardy Taylor plays for the Giants,” we can 
likely settle the matter by watching Giants games or checking on the internet. Even 
predictive claims can be judged more or less plausible based on empirical evidence. 
Facts about the world today can make predictions more or less likely to come true.  
Empirical investigation certainly won’t resolve all factual disputes. Relevant facts 
may be unavailable. Or a claim might be ambiguous if, for example, I use “Giants” 
to refer to a baseball team while you use it to refer to a football team. But at least 
when clearly stated descriptive claims are in dispute, we can often resolve them by 
empirical investigation. 
If, on the other hand, I assert that “hunting animals purely for leisure is unethical, 
and people should stop doing it,” I am making a morally normative claim about how 
the world ought to be. Assessing the claim is rather complicated. Unlike descriptive 
arguments addressed to matters of fact, normative arguments typically have both fact 
and value components. The argument that we shouldn’t hunt purely for leisure might 
depend on matters of fact, such as the amount of physical and emotional pain animals 
 
 
 8. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, The Entanglement of Fact and Value, in THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS 28, 45 (2002).  
 9. See, e.g., id. at 30–31. 
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typically experience when hunted or the number of animals hunted for leisure 
annually relative to their population sizes. But it will also depend on matters of value, 
including our moral obligations, if any, to animals or to reduce unnecessary pain in 
general. These issues of moral value cannot be resolved by appeal to easily observed 
facts.10   
Precisely what we are doing when we debate values is complicated and defies 
shorthand description. Scholars must be clear, though, about when their claims are 
descriptive and when they are normative. We may agree about certain facts and 
certain values, but if we don’t know precisely what claims are being made and the 
extent to which they depend on disputed facts or values, we are unlikely to resolve 
disagreements.  
1. Example: Waldron Clouds Normativity of His Thesis 
Scholars often confuse descriptive and normative claims simply because they are 
insufficiently attuned to the differences. The problem, then, has a straightforward 
solution: don’t confuse them. Sometimes, however, scholars quite attuned to the 
differences simply spell out their views in ways that are somewhat opaque as to their 
normativity.  
For example, in a paper supporting the rationale for the separation of powers 
doctrine, Jeremy Waldron notes that the “separation of powers” is never explicitly 
mentioned in the United States Constitution.11 Nevertheless, he writes, “[s]ometimes 
standards of political evaluation are compelling for us, even when the compulsion is 
not legal.”12 Are they compelling, though, as a descriptive matter of human 
psychology? Is he merely saying that we tend to believe in the separation of powers 
principle? He describes the principle as a “touchstone[] of institutional legitimacy,”13 
 
 
 10. A statement that appears descriptive at first glance may nevertheless contain or imply 
moral assertions as well. Suppose I say, “I’ve told you many times not to be so mean to your 
mother.” On the surface, I’m making a descriptive claim about what I have said in the past. 
Empirical data from an eyewitness, for example, might confirm it. The thrust of the statement, 
however, is likely directed at a normative claim. It implies that you should behave in a manner 
that is less mean to your mother. The truth of that claim cannot be resolved by empirical 
investigation alone. 
  The statement also strongly implies a claim about prior conduct, namely, that you have been 
repeatedly mean to your mother. This claim has both descriptive and normative components. 
It probably makes the descriptive claim that you have engaged in bad behaviors in the past, as 
well as the normative claim that, whatever those behaviors were, they can be described as 
“mean.” Either of these implied claims could be in dispute. We might agree about certain 
empirical facts (that you repeatedly called your mother a “shrew”) but disagree about the 
implied normative claim (that your use of the term “shrew” was inappropriate under the 
circumstances). Alternatively, we might agree about the implied normative claim (for 
example, we agree it is always mean to call one’s mother a shrew) but disagree about the 
implied descriptive claim that you have ever done such a thing. 
 11. See Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 433, 436 (2013). 
 12. Id. at 438. 
 13. Id. 
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but does he mean that in fact we treat it as a touchstone or that we ought to treat it as 
a touchstone? 
At one point, Waldron indirectly suggests that the separation of powers principle 
does have moral force: 
By saying we should treat the separation of powers principle as an 
important political principle, albeit a non-legal one, I do not mean to say 
that it has merely “moral” force, as though it were just something a 
particular theorist dreamed up and now wants the rest of us to watch him 
apply. The principle of separation of powers has a powerful place in the 
tradition of political thought long accepted as canonical among us.14 
But if Waldron thinks the separation of powers principle has at least some moral 
force, why does he support the claim by appealing to the fact that the principle is part 
of the constitutional tradition we find canonical? (I see why a legal principle of 
separation of powers might gain legal force by its association with a canonical 
tradition, but Waldron explicitly speaks of the principle as being nonlegal.) Facts 
about the acceptance of various moral arguments are not pertinent to the strength of 
those moral arguments (except perhaps in very indirect ways). As David Hume 
famously argued, you cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.”15 My view of the 
immorality of Nazi medical experimentation is not weakened by the number of Nazis 
who approved of it.  
As one of our most distinguished legal philosophers, Waldron is surely attuned to 
the normativity of his claims, making his somewhat obtuse discussion of the 
normativity of the separation of powers principle more noteworthy. This is especially 
so in the context of his thesis, as he argues that the separation of powers principle 
has a distinctive feature. Namely, separating powers leads state actors to more 
carefully articulate rules in advance and to “govern[] through successive phases of 
governance each of which maintains its own integrity.”16 So what Waldron takes to 
 
 
 14. Id. at 437. 
 15.  
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, 
be found of some importance. In every system of morality which I have hitherto 
met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes 
observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, 
that instead of the usual copulations of the propositions, is, and is not, I meet with 
no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. . . . For as 
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is 
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a 
reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But 
as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend 
it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the 
[common] systems of morality . . . . 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. in CLASSICS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 
829 (Michael L. Morgan ed., 2d ed. 1996) (emphasis in original).  
 16. Waldron, supra note 11, at 467 (emphasis in original).  
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be most distinctive and important about the separation of powers is that it encourages 
articulation, a view he takes to be a novel rationale for the separation of powers. But 
if what’s most important about the separation of powers comes from a novel 
explanation, then it is less clear why traditional constitutional practices bear so 
heavily on the separation of powers when they failed to (at least explicitly) recognize 
what Waldron takes to be its most important rationale.  
Notice, of course, that there are many interesting questions associated with the 
separation of powers principle—some principally factual, some deeply value laden.17 
Waldron isn’t trying to answer all such questions. He gets to pick his thesis, and his 
goals are more modest. But he does spend the better part of his article supporting the 
separation of powers doctrine without making clear how deeply rooted the doctrine 
is in moral considerations as opposed to just our traditional constitutional practices. 
Maybe he thinks political principles have normative force separate and apart from 
moral considerations, but again, it would help to be more explicit about it.18 Are we, 
for example, blameworthy when we fail to instantiate politically normative 
principles?  
In the end, I’m not sure precisely what portion of Waldron’s claims can be tested 
empirically (by, for example, going out and examining the behavior of actual 
political entities that articulate governance and seeing how they perform) and what 
portion of his claims are value laden (such that we must debate underlying issues of 
value). True, legal scholars rarely say much to distinguish these components. But if 
we’re going to carefully debate and hope to resolve disputes, we have no choice but 
to wade into these difficult waters.  
II. MORAL NORMATIVITY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS 
The distinction between description and moral normativity stays essentially the 
same when we move into a legal context. We can either describe law or make morally 
normative claims about what the law should be. While description is the bread and 
butter of lawyers and moral normativity is the bread and butter of legal scholars, both 
professions engage in both tasks.  
 
 
 17. For example, do we have moral obligations to support the separation of powers 
principle? If we do, how strong are those obligations? What are the costs of separating powers, 
and how do they compare to the benefits? If separating powers is a good thing, why merely 
separate legislative, executive, and judicial functions, when we could subdivide these further? 
When deciding on further subdivisions, what are the pertinent considerations? And if we know 
what those considerations are, then what do we gain by referring to the “separation of powers 
principle”? Given its amorphous nature, could we simply focus on structuring government 
institutions in ways that capture the underlying benefits we care about without explicit 
reference to the separation of powers? 
 18. While this Article was in the law review editing process, Waldron released a draft 
paper that suggests he is focusing on political normativity. Jeremy Waldron, Non-Normative 
Principles 23 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 19-36, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3400296 
[https://perma.cc/856P-S65J] (“The separation of powers is definitely a political principle and 
no account of our constitutional tradition would be good without it.”); cf. id. at 27 (recognizing 
debate as to the continuity between “the politically normative character of a principle like 
separation of powers and its legally normative character”). 
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Matters get trickier when claims blend descriptive and normative elements in 
nontransparent ways. They can also be tricky when scholars make claims intended 
to be legally normative but not morally normative. My goal is not to delineate precise 
distinctions between these different sorts of claims but to encourage authors to be 
more explicit about the kinds of claims they seek to make. 
A. Descriptive Legal Claims 
If I say, “This jurisdiction requires commercial hair stylists to have professional 
licenses,” I’m making a descriptive claim about the law. We could test my assertion 
by, for example, consulting statutes, cases, and regulations in the pertinent 
jurisdiction. We could also interview spectators present in the legislative body when 
a pertinent statute was passed. But whether I love or hate the licensing regime, my 
statement concerns matters of fact, not of value.19 
Practicing attorneys often make descriptive claims to clients such as, “The statute 
says W,” or “The Sixth Circuit has held X.” Since interesting legal claims are often 
indeterminate to varying degrees, many statements about the law are best framed in 
probabilistic terms, “The law is probably Y,” or in predictive terms, “The judge will 
likely hold Z.”20 Probabilistic and predictive information is precisely what clients 
tend to seek from attorneys. They want to know what the law is or is likely to be. 
Sometimes, clients may want to know what sort of law is in their best interests. But 
rarely do paying clients ask which laws are best from a moral perspective, and if they 
do, they’re seeking more than just legal advice; they’re seeking moral advice.21  
In legal briefs, attorneys often make confident assertions about hazy legal issues. 
They might say, “This agreement is clearly binding,” when any good lawyer would 
only truly believe that a court might find it binding. Lawyers regularly blend 
normative and descriptive claims when they think doing so will benefit their clients. 
They frequently speak of what the law is for rhetorical effect, believing that judges 
and opposing counsel will find such talk more persuasive. 
To the extent that claims about what the law should be are disguised as descriptive 
legal claims, lawyers are being, in some respects, insincere. The insincerity need not 
trouble us because we all know the context of these assertions. While rules of 
professional responsibility limit lawyers’ abilities to make false statements about the 
law,22 within certain boundaries, lawyerly assertions about what the law is are really 
assertions about what their clients think it should be or would like it to be.  
 
 
 19. As noted, the fact-value distinction is not entirely precise. Some facts are value laden 
and, perhaps, some value propositions are matters of fact. I believe, however, that the 
distinction is sufficiently clear for present purposes. In some contexts, authors may need to be 
even more precise if there is a genuine risk of ambiguity. 
 20. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated that “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will 
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law.” Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897).  
 21. Lawyers are certainly permitted to address nonlegal matters. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 2.1 (“In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client’s situation.”).  
 22. Id. r. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to 
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Judges use similar tactics.23 They often refer to what the law is as though prior 
cases make current law quite clear. But often, prior law does not make a case at bar 
clear, and judges know it. They speak insincerely of what the law is to get the same 
rhetorical benefit that lawyers seek. They proclaim their decisions not only correct 
but obviously so. 
Importantly, however, judicial claims about the content of the law differ from 
those made by attorneys. In the context of a judicial opinion, a judge’s assertion about 
the law can actually make it so. When a judge writes, “It is hereby decided that the 
agreement is legally binding,” the writing not only makes an assertion but also has 
legal force. Attorneys obviously lack the same power. Still, judicial opinions are 
insincere or at least unclear to the extent they describe the state of the law as more 
determinate than it actually is. 
When law students ask professors what the law is, they are typically seeking 
descriptive information. They more often want to know what the law is than what 
the professor thinks it ought to be. But students occasionally ask both kinds of 
questions, so the distinction should be made clear. 
1. Example: Kadish et al. on Obligations to Retreat 
A leading criminal law casebook asks students to imagine a homeowner who 
invites a friend over for food and drink. At some point, the friend grabs a knife and 
threatens imminently to stab the homeowner—conditions under which the 
homeowner would ordinarily have a legal right to use deadly self-defense. The 
question is whether the homeowner may use deadly self-defense if she is able to 
escape from her attacker in complete safety by, say, walking out the door and driving 
away.24 The casebook authors write: “Only a few states would require the 
homeowner to retreat in this situation; the great majority permit the homeowner to 
kill in self-defense. Do you agree?”25 
Taken too literally, the authors seem to be asking students about a factual matter. 
Namely, do students agree with the authors’ assertion that most jurisdictions would 
not require retreat under these circumstances? But the authors almost certainly 
intended to ask the more interesting question: Should homeowners be required to 
retreat when attacked by invited guests? And that, of course, is a moral question that 
descriptive claims about the law cannot resolve for us. We know what the authors 
meant, but they missed an opportunity to help students clearly distinguish legal issues 
that are purely descriptive from those that are more value laden. 
2. Example: Kolber Mushes Together Distinct Concepts of Informed Consent  
Let me give an example from another scholar who is usually quite careful to 
distinguish moral principles and legal doctrine: me. In this excerpt, I should have 
 
 
a tribunal . . . .”). 
 23. See infra Section IV.A. 
 24. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CAROL S. STEIKER & RACHEL E. 
BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 867 (9th ed. 2012). 
 25. Id. 
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drawn a clearer distinction between the legal doctrine of informed consent and the 
moral principle underlying it: 
Over the last fifty years or so, lawyers and bioethicists have increasingly 
emphasized the obligation of healthcare practitioners to respect the 
autonomous decisions of competent patients by obtaining their informed 
consent prior to treatment. Informed consent is said to be “perhaps the 
oldest and most basic legal implementation of bioethical principles.” 
According to the doctrine of informed consent, practitioners are required 
to make certain disclosures to patients prior to beginning medical 
procedures and to obtain the patient’s permission to proceed.26 
I don’t think anything I said here was false. But it’s not as clear as it could have 
been. There is not one “doctrine of informed consent” but at least two: a legal 
doctrine (with many variations) that can be enforced in court, and a moral version 
(with many variations) that is intended to guide behavior but has no independent 
legal force.  
The difference between the two versions of informed consent can be critically 
important. Consider, for example, that the legal doctrine of informed consent focuses 
on information a doctor must disclose. So long as the information is disclosed, 
doctors have limited, if any, legal obligations to ensure that the information was 
actually understood.27 But from a moral perspective, such an approach may seem 
suspect. We don’t much promote autonomous patient decision-making by revealing 
information to patients that they do not or cannot understand. Given that there is both 
a moral and a legal doctrine of informed consent, speaking about them as one and 
the same conceals important differences. 
B. Morally Normative Legal Claims 
In the prior Section, I noted that claims about what the law is often merely 
describe the state of the law. A lawyer might confidently assert that some jurisdiction 
recognizes comparative rather than contributory negligence. As a statement about 
what is the case, it expresses nothing about which form of liability is preferable. 
Other times, we speak about how the law should be in morally normative terms. 
1. Moral Normativity in Legal Contexts 
If I say, “This jurisdiction should not require hairstylists to have licenses,” I am 
likely making a moral claim about how we ought to live our lives if, depending on 
 
 
 26. Adam J. Kolber, A Limited Defense of Clinical Placebo Deception, 26 YALE L. & 
POL’Y. REV. 75, 93 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 417 (2006)).  
 27. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“In duty-to-disclose 
cases, the focus of attention is more properly upon the nature and content of the physician’s 
divulgence than the patient’s understanding or consent. . . . As we later emphasize, the 
physician discharges the duty when he makes a reasonable effort to convey sufficient 
information although the patient, without fault of the physician, may not fully grasp it.”).  
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one’s preferred formulation, we want to do what is morally required or permissible 
or maximizes well-being or some such. This moral claim happens to be situated in a 
legal context, but it is a moral claim nonetheless.28 I might concede that statutes and 
court decisions make it crystal clear that hairstylists need licenses. Still, I could argue 
that the law should change or that you should vote against licenses in a referendum. 
Generally speaking, no law dictates how you should vote on a referendum or how 
legislators should vote on legislation.  
Most legal scholarship today seems to make morally normative claims.29 For 
clarity, scholars should speak of what the law is or is likely to be when making 
descriptive claims and speak of what the law should be when making normative 
claims. We need not rely solely on a few magic words to draw the necessary 
distinction, however. A recent scholarly conference, for example, asks whether 
“today’s First Amendment over-protect[s] the speech of bullies, bigots, and 
businesses.”30 Since, as a matter of description, the First Amendment always protects 
precisely what it protects, we know the organizers, by asking about “over 
protection,” are presenting a normative question of some sort. When in doubt, 
however, authors should make sure that their meaning is clear.  
2. Interstitial Moral Considerations 
Moral normativity can be tricky in legal contexts because it comes up in at least 
two different places. First, moral issues can be internal to the law: a body of law 
might be indeterminate to varying degrees and, one might think, the law itself calls 
upon judges, prosecutors, and other legal actors to fill in the blanks using moral 
reasoning. For better or worse, this gap-filling role is frequently associated with 
common law reasoning and with constitutional law. We can describe the analysis as 
raising “interstitial moral considerations” when the law itself dictates gap-filling by 
reference to morality. 
The law often limits the scope of interstitial moral considerations. It might say or 
imply that only certain moral considerations are permissible, such as those consistent 
with American constitutional values. In such cases, it can be difficult to untangle the 
extent to which judges are called upon to exercise their own moral discretion and the 
extent to which they are supposed to apply values assigned by law. For example, a 
statute may grant a judge the option to sentence some particular defendant to either 
 
 
 28. Now instead of saying that this jurisdiction should not require licenses, I could make 
the slightly different claim that this jurisdiction should stop requiring hair stylists to have 
licenses. Then, I would be making both a descriptive and a normative claim. On the descriptive 
side, I would be asserting that this jurisdiction does require licenses as a matter of law. After 
all, you cannot stop requiring licenses if you’re not currently requiring them. But I would also 
be making the morally normative claim that current practice should change. So, whether this 
jurisdiction should stop requiring licenses has both descriptive and normative components. 
 29. Cf. Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and 
Balancing, 98 IOWA L. REV. 535, 537 (2013) (stating that normative legal theories “currently 
dominate the leading legal scholarship”).  
 30. See Derek Bambauer, Is Free Speech for Assholes?, INFO/LAW (Jan. 30, 2016), 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/infolaw/2016/01/30/is-free-speech-for-assholes/ [https://perma.cc 
/6HTY-XTNY]. 
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probation or zero to ten years in prison. Assume the judge believes the offender 
morally deserves only probation but, because another statute requires certain 
retributive considerations to be taken into account, the judge believes that any 
sentence less than four years is legally impermissible. In that case, sentencing the 
offender to four years in prison might be the best option given the legal constraints 
on the judge’s choice. But it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where the law stops and 
judicial moral discretion begins. 
3. Unfettered Moral Considerations 
By contrast, even after a judge has exhausted all pertinent sources of law, 
including any interstitial moral discretion the law grants, the judge must still make a 
moral decision as to how to behave. A judge deciding a decade ago whether there is 
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage would consider pertinent constitutional 
provisions and case precedents, along with whatever interstitial moral discretion they 
afford, and reach a legal conclusion. Such conclusions do not necessarily end 
decisions about what judges morally ought to do, for we can still ask whether judges 
should decide only in accordance with their best interpretations of the law.31 That is 
a moral question the law cannot answer.  
Even if some source of law emphasized that judges should not consider their own 
moral values, sources of law cannot possibly eliminate the moral question of whether 
a judge should act in accordance with the law. Moreover, unfettered moral 
considerations apply not only in important civil rights cases or when the republic 
itself is in jeopardy. They potentially arise in every single case from administrative 
law to zoological law. You may believe that, ordinarily, judges should act in 
accordance with law because doing so is the most moral option, and that may well 
be true. But that is a controversial moral claim that must be defended. 
Some claims are ambiguous as to whether they incorporate interstitial or 
unfettered moral considerations or both. The difference can be important, however. 
Consider again the judge who believes the offender she is sentencing morally ought 
to receive only probation. The pertinent statute, let us assume, provides for an 
unreviewable sentence from probation to ten years in prison, but the judge believes 
the law requires consideration of retributive factors that dictate a sentence of at least 
four years in prison.  
Two scholars might agree with the judge’s legal interpretation but appear to give 
different advice. One might say the judge “should” give a four-year sentence, while 
the other might say the judge “should” give the offender probation. Yet, there may 
be no substantive disagreement if the first scholar refers to a legal determination that 
includes interstitial moral decision-making while the second refers to an overall 
choice that incorporates unfettered moral considerations. 
How judges ought to use their interstitial or unfettered moral discretion will often 
depends on truths about the nature of morality. We needn’t rely on such truths, 
 
 
 31. Emad Atiq goes further than most, arguing that “judges are not legally obliged to 
follow preexisting law in hard cases, and, moreover, that they are not so obliged from any 
other normative perspective (say, that of morality).” Emad H. Atiq, Legal Obligation & Its 
Limits, 38 L. & PHIL. 109, 112 (2019) (emphasis added). 
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however, when making descriptive claims. If you ask what the law is on some matter, 
I will consider precedent and how real-world judges are likely to utilize whatever 
discretion they are given. The positive state of the law does not depend on the truth 
of moral claims. Judges’ perceptions of morality may well be relevant to descriptive 
statements about the law, but judges’ perceptions of morality are largely irrelevant 
to the truth of moral claims unless you believe that judges are especially likely (or 
unlikely) to be right.  
4. Prudential Normativity and Pure Legal Normativity 
Earlier, I used the sentence “This jurisdiction should not require hairstylists to 
have licenses” as an example of a moral claim. But the speaker might have had a 
different kind of normativity in mind. A lawyer advising an industry association 
might say, “This jurisdiction should not require hair stylists to have licenses,” 
because that would fail to maximize the profits of the association’s members. The 
lawyer could mean “should” in a prudential, self-interested, nonmoral sense. But that 
is not the kind of normative inquiry in which most scholars are engaged; if you are 
referring to prudential self-interest, you should make that explicit.  
Rather than speaking of prudential normativity, one can speak of a very pure form 
of legal normativity: “This jurisdiction should not require hair stylists to have 
licenses because a licensing requirement would violate the jurisdiction’s 
constitution.” The scholar need not be endorsing the constitutional provision. She is 
merely stating that, according to the law itself, the jurisdiction should drop the 
licensing requirement. Thus, she may be speaking of legal normativity, where the 
“should” in her statement refers not to a moral ought but to the more pedestrian ought 
that characterizes what the law tells us to do.  
We can speak in a similar way about norms of etiquette. In some locales, forks go 
on the left side of a place setting as a matter of good manners. But this rule of 
etiquette is not a matter of morality. You are not a morally bad person for breaching 
a rule of etiquette. Similarly, you are not a morally bad person simply because you 
breach a legal rule. To reach that conclusion, we would need some further claim 
about the harms of the particular law broken or a defense of a debatable general claim 
that all lawbreaking is immoral. Unless conjoined with other claims, legal 
normativity yields no overall conclusion as to how you ought to behave.  
We can now inventory several claims we have so far seen. Imagine a close case 
as to whether the Fourth Amendment precludes admission of inculpatory evidence 
of a serious crime.32 I could make the pure descriptive claim that the court will allow 
admission. This could be a prediction with no implication as to the merits of what 
the court is likely to do. Alternatively, I could make a pure legally normative claim 
about what I think principles of law themselves require: “Though it is a close case, 
the weight of precedent shows that the evidence should be excluded.” Yet consistent 
with the preceding, I could claim that, despite the weight of the precedent and all 
 
 
 32. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“Under this rule, evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding 
against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.”); see also Yale Kamisar, “Comparative 
Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
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pertinent sources of law, I think the judge “should” refuse to apply the exclusionary 
rule as a matter of her all-things-considered moral obligation. I might reach that view 
because I believe the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a travesty of justice, 
and we have a moral obligation to subvert it. None of these statements necessarily 
contradict the others. So, if you don’t distinguish them, we often won’t know what 
you’re talking about. 
Some legal scholarship only makes descriptive legal claims.33 So limited, there is 
no risk of illicitly mixing the descriptive and the normative. And some legal 
scholarship may use legally normative claims in ways that are meant to be 
interchangeable with descriptive legal claims. That is, authors may speak of what 
judges should do, meaning merely that the law requires such-and-such result. Again, 
it is important to help readers understand your meaning, as legally normative 
language can add much confusion if your reader incorrectly assumes you are making 
all-things-considered moral claims. 
When scholars speak of “normative” legal scholarship, I think they usually mean 
morally normative scholarship about the law. The traditional jargon in legal 
scholarship distinguishes between doctrinal work (which focuses on the current state 
of the law and maybe tries to identify some noteworthy patterns or principles 
underlying it) and normative scholarship. Since pure legally normative claims are 
often close cousins of descriptive legal claims, I imagine most people would describe 
such scholarship as “doctrinal” and reserve the term “normative” for morally 
normative claims. If there is any doubt, though, about the nature of one’s normative 
claims, it helps to be specific.  
C. Natural Law Approaches  
To be sure, there is much debate about exactly what law is and how it relates to 
morality. Under some views, the relationship between the descriptive and the 
normative is more complicated than I have so far presented it. Natural law 
proponents, for example, “hold that because law purports to guide action and impose 
obligations, the validity of any proposition as law depends on its conformity to moral 
standards.”34 If they believe that valid law must correspond with moral values fixed 
outside the law, then it seems they cannot speak of what the law is without reference 
to what it morally ought to be. A natural lawyer might say, “Though the Constitution 
is currently interpreted to provide a legal right to abortion, such rights are contrary 
to morality and are, therefore, not valid law.” By saying that alleged legal rights “are” 
not valid, the natural lawyer sounds like she is making a descriptive claim. But she 
is actually making a claim that goes beyond the descriptive. She is saying something 
like: civil law purports to offer a right that contravenes the natural moral order, and 
that is bad or ineffectual. 
Personally, I am not attracted to the natural law approach. I incline toward some 
version of legal positivism that “hold[s] that the status of a norm as law depends on 
 
 
 33. For example, in Adam J. Kolber, Two Views of First Amendment Thought Privacy, 
18 J. CONST. L. 1381 (2016), I emphasize that I only make a predictive claim: “I predict that 
at least a significant minority of judges would deem a card counting prohibition 
unconstitutional . . . .” Id. at 4. 
 34. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 24 (2008). 
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social facts and, in particular, on the fact that the norm was posited by a source 
generally recognized as a lawmaking authority.”35 Indeed, most legal scholars who 
opine on the matter seem to be legal positivists of one sort or another.36 But I am not 
opening up a huge jurisprudential debate. My argument is for clarity. Suppose you 
seek advice as to whether an abortion is legal under your circumstances. You do not 
want your natural law attorney to simply say that all abortions are unlawful, full stop. 
At a minimum, you want your attorney to note that civil law does provide something 
at least called a legal right to abortion and that, in ordinary situations, you will not 
be prosecuted for having a previability abortion.37  
In other words, regardless of whatever natural lawyers call law, we want them to 
clearly break down their views into descriptive and normative parts. I make the same 
request of natural law scholars. When speaking of what the law is, they will generally 
be understood as making descriptive claims that do not depend on the truth of moral 
propositions. If they mean otherwise, they should make it clear somewhere in their 
scholarship.  
I understand the temptation to say that laws that violate our moral preferences are 
not law. Indeed, legal scholars are frequently seduced into believing that the law is 
precisely what they would like it to be. But nothing could be less scholarly. If you 
want to sway our views based on value claims, be clear that you are doing so as part 
of a rigorous argument to that effect. To the extent that your undefended moral views 
influence your academic interpretation of what the law is, you should seek to 
minimize your biases or at least be as transparent about them as possible.  
1. Dworkinian Blending of Law and Morality 
Ronald Dworkin famously defended an antipositivist view, sometimes considered 
a natural law view, that he called “law as integrity.”38 He claimed that law is best 
understood as a process of interpretive construction under which judges should 
assume “that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and 
fairness and procedural due process.”39 The law has integrity, according to Dworkin, 
 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. According to Robin West, legal positivism is “once again the reigning philosophical 
and jurisprudential framework of the legal academy.” Robin West, Normative Jurisprudence, 
in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 55, 58 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009). 
 37. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). Notice that 
there may be few, if any, practical differences between a natural lawyer and a positivist lawyer. 
A natural lawyer might say abortion protections are not law even though civil authorities 
recognize those protections as law. A positivist lawyer with similar inclinations might say that 
abortion protections are indeed part of the law but ought not to be. The differences between 
these jurisprudential stances may be largely terminological. Though they may apply the term 
“law” somewhat differently, it’s not clear that the difference otherwise affects their behavior. 
See generally David Enoch, Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?, in DIMENSIONS OF 
NORMATIVITY: NEW ESSAYS ON METAETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE 65 (David Plunkett, Scott J. 
Shapiro & Kevin Toh eds., 2019); Dan Priel, Is There One Right Answer to the Question of 
the Nature of Law?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW (Wil Waluchow 
& Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2013).  
 38. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986).  
 39. Id. at 225, 243. 
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when we are faithful to the principles underlying precedent while, at the same time, 
interpreting the law as best we can from the perspective of political morality. 
Dworkin’s view could be considered a natural law view in that the actual content of 
the law depends on truths about justice and fairness as opposed to just people’s 
perceptions of these moral concepts. 
On Dworkin’s view, judges should decide cases according to principles that best 
fit prior precedent and justify the law. Accurate statements of law, according to 
Dworkin, depend on both prior precedent and moral considerations.40 If the very 
nature of law depends on facts about the content of the law along with normative 
claims about morality, some Dworkinians might challenge my emphasis on teasing 
apart what the law is from what it should be. 
This objection fails.41 Assume first that our goal is to describe or predict judicial 
behavior, and let us assume that judges actually use the approach Dworkin 
recommends. In that case, our predictions still do not depend on the truth of moral 
assertions. They depend on empirical facts about how judges understand both 
precedent and their moral obligations. Dworkinians who seek to describe past 
decisions or predict future decisions, like others making descriptive claims, must 
focus on issues of fact, not value. We cannot infer judicial behavior from claims 
about how judges ought to behave. 
By contrast, when Dworkinians consider how judges ought to behave, I offer 
similar advice as I give to more generic natural law views: be as clear and precise as 
possible. For example, Dworkin requires a threshold fit between a proposed legal 
principle and prior cases. Such judgments of fit may involve some claims about fact 
and some about value. The total body of binding precedential cases concerns matters 
of fact, but the judgment of fit may involve a complicated combination of fact and 
value claims. Since each of these kinds of claims is evaluated differently and depends 
on different evidence, scholars should try to break them down into their component 
parts as much as possible.  
After a judgment of fit has been made, Dworkinians will try to identify a principle 
that puts the law in the best light from a moral perspective. Judges should consider 
what decisions “give voice as well as effect to convictions about morality that are 
widespread through the community.”42 Part of what judges should consider are 
empirical facts—the values of a community and how decisions will be perceived in 
 
 
 40. When a judge identifies a principle in the law: 
[H]e reports not a simple-minded claim about the motives of past statesmen, a 
claim a wise cynic can easily refute, but an interpretive proposal: that the 
principle both fits and justifies some complex part of legal practice, that it 
provides an attractive way to see, in the structure of that practice, the consistency 
of principle integrity requires. Law’s optimism is in that way conceptual; claims 
of law are endemically constructive, just in virtue of the kind of claims they are.  
Id. at 228. 
 41. For some criticism of Dworkin’s view, see Larry Alexander, Striking Back at the 
Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin’s Theory of Law, 6 L. & PHIL. 419 (1987); 
John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire, 6 L. & PHIL. 357 (1987); Brian Leiter, 
The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J.            
165 (2004). 
 42. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 248. 
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light of those values. And part of what they are to consider, Dworkin tells us, are 
their “more substantive political convictions about the relative moral value of 
[different] interpretations.”43 So even when following Dworkin’s recommended 
approach, some parts of the analysis are principally empirical and some principally 
value oriented. Either way, we all benefit when the analysis is broken down into 
descriptive and normative parts. 
D. Challenges to the Fact-Value Distinction and to Moral Normativity Itself 
I argue that scholars should better distinguish the descriptive and normative parts 
of their arguments. But what if there’s really no good distinction between the two? 
More broadly, what if there’s no such thing as moral normativity?  
Joshua Kleinfeld takes such considerations to show that the fact-value distinction 
is not a sharp one. He bemoans “the rigidity with which contemporary academic legal 
culture invokes the fact-value distinction”44 and believes it quite fine to offer 
arguments that blend the descriptive and the normative. It’s not the case, he argues, 
that “every well-formed claim in the world could be set straightforwardly on one side 
of the ledger or the other like so many zeroes and ones.”45 Indeed, he finds it ironic 
that law professors insist on a fact-value distinction but then regularly fail to honor 
it:  
Is the corrective justice view of tort law, which holds that the doctrinal 
structure of tort law reflects ideals of corrective justice, normative or 
descriptive? Well, both; it is a sort of idealizing interpretation. What 
about the economic view that regards tort law as an instrument for 
efficient resource allocation? Again, the view is at once normative and 
descriptive: it is an interpretation of the existing legal system with critical 
force to the extent the system diverges from it. What about a view of 
contract law as the legal effectuation of promise-keeping values? The 
interpenetration of normative and descriptive ideas in that view is 
impossible to unravel — either in principle (because the two categories 
are not truly separate) or in practice (because the two categories get so 
entwined in the course of argument) or both. When a lawyer argues that 
the Establishment Clause prohibits school-sponsored prayer in public 
schools, is that a descriptive claim about what the Constitution does 
mean or a normative one about what it should mean? What about when 
a lawyer argues that a contract’s reference to “reasonable efforts” means 
whatever efforts are standard in the industry rather than all cost-justified 
efforts? Entanglement is a normal feature of human understanding in 
general, but it is, if anything, particularly pronounced in law. Law is 




 43. Id.  
 44. Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1534 (2016).  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 1535–36 (footnotes omitted). 
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I have three responses. First, even if there are borderline claims that blur facts and 
values, they do not defeat the distinction altogether. Many statements, and I’ve given 
several examples, appear to fall quite squarely on one side or the other. Many others, 
even if initially ambiguous, can be clarified or broken down into easily distinguished 
components. The person who reports seeing a parent hit a child “cruelly” can likely 
describe what she observed in factual terms (for example, the parent hit the child 
three times across the face) and separately describe her moral evaluation (for 
example, it grossly exceeded the bounds of appropriate parental discipline). Indeed, 
when confronted by sometimes vague distinctions, it becomes especially important 
to be clear and precise about their contours.  
We face a similar challenge when distinguishing statements of fact not from 
morally normative statements but from prudentially normative statements. Surely 
one could make arguments similar to Kleinfeld’s: can we really draw a bright line 
between our observations of events and our own self-serving biases and best 
interests? Aren’t claims about how things are often entangled with views about how 
we would personally like them to be? As a matter of human psychology, we may 
indeed entangle beliefs about facts and beliefs about our best interests. Still, the 
standard scholarly response is to do what we can to loosen the entanglement or at 
least disclose matters that interfere with the clarity and objectivity of scholarly 
claims. In other words, entanglement risks are real; the solution is to disentangle all 
the more vigorously. 
An examination of Kleinfeld’s legal examples reinforces my claims that legal 
scholars are too ambiguous. If a scholar states that “tort law in X jurisdiction follows 
principles of corrective justice,” we should expect the scholar to explain whether she 
is simply describing current doctrine, asserting what doctrine ought to do, or making 
both claims. There are some rather easy test questions to ask, for example: “If the 
jurisdiction made major statutory changes that explicitly make economic efficiency 
the goal of tort law, would you still claim that tort law in this jurisdiction follows 
principles of corrective justice?”  
Kleinfeld also claims that it is “impossible to unravel” the descriptive and 
normative components of the view that contracts effectuate promise-keeping 
values.47 In fact, we can simply ask scholars what they mean and they can usually 
explain. Or consider his rhetorical question, “What about when a lawyer argues that 
a contract’s reference to ‘reasonable efforts’ means whatever efforts are standard in 
the industry rather than all cost-justified efforts?” This is precisely the sort of 
question where the distinction between facts and values is easy to make: are we 
supposed to resolve what “reasonable efforts” are by observing what people actually 
do in some industry or are we supposed to include value considerations in 
determining what is cost justified? None of these issues seem impossible to unravel. 
Sure, there may be ambiguities at the margins. Indeed, we always have some 
uncertainty when interpreting what others mean. But the solution is to make our 
claims clearer, not to give up on precision.  
Second, if it turns out that the fact-value distinction isn’t just a little vague but is 
fundamentally incoherent, then all of normative scholarship is in jeopardy. If people 
believe that there is no general distinction between descriptive and normative claims, 
 
 
 47. Id. at 1536. 
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then what do they mean when they tell us we ought to do something? There surely 
are deep and important questions about what this whole “morality” thing is and 
whether we can make sense of it. But once you’ve gone down the road of writing 
morally normative scholarship, you will generally be interpreted as accepting the 
existence of moral normativity. Put differently, if you are making morally normative 
claims while denying the fact-value distinction, tell us why your claims should be 
treated as anything more than glowing pixels or toner on paper that have no purchase 
on how we ought to behave. Radical denials of the fact-value distinction, even if true, 
are beyond the scope of this Article on morally normative scholarship because they 
preclude moral normativity.  
Third, while I’ve dipped a toe into the debate about the fact-value distinction, my 
overarching claim aims to be largely agnostic about substantive debates in law and 
philosophy. What matters is not so much whether there is a good distinction between 
descriptive and normative claims but rather how we are to understand the claims that 
scholars actually make. In our efforts to interpret scholarship, we must recognize that 
scholars sometimes intend to make factual assertions, sometimes intend to make 
value assertions, and sometimes simply write ambiguously because they aren’t 
carefully attending to the differences. We can, however, seek to clarify what scholars 
mean, even if we are all mistaken in believing that there is a fact-value distinction. If 
a scholar writes about unicorns, we can still query their beliefs about unicorns. 
Failing to do so would fail to understand their meaning.  
Returning to the real world, when scholars say that the failure to obtain affirmative 
consent to sex constitutes rape, they may mean that a judge will find that to be the 
case or that a judge should find that to be the case. Even those who doubt the 
existence of moral normativity can still admit that scholars mean different things 
when they speak normatively as opposed to descriptively. If we aim to understand 
each other, we ought to bring such meanings to the surface no matter what we 
ultimately take to be true.  
Kleinfeld and I agree on several points. We both believe there is a fact-value 
distinction and that it addresses something important,48 though we likely disagree 
over just how fuzzy the distinction is. We also agree that scholars regularly mush 
together claims about facts and values. Kleinfeld believes that legal scholars rigidly 
insist on a fact-value distinction that they regularly refuse to honor, while I believe 
that legal scholars neither insist on the distinction nor honor it. 
Our central difference, though, is about how scholars ought to behave in light of 
the imperfection of the fact-value distinction. Kleinfeld seems quite comfortable with 
the ambiguity, while I argue that even if there are tough cases along the fact-value 
continuum, scholars should be as clear as reasonably possible about their meaning. 
And I hope to show in the next Part that there can be real benefits when scholars 
make their claims more precise. 
 
 
 48. Id. at 1536 (footnote omitted) (“My point is not that the normative/descriptive 
distinction is altogether confused or meaningless (though some distinguished philosophers 
think it is). I actually think the distinction gets at something important and there are deep 
reasons why contemporary intellectual culture is fixated on it. My point is that the nature and 
scope of the distinction is much more disputed and complex than one would think from the 
way it is often treated in the legal academy.”). 
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III. THE BENEFITS OF CLARITY 
In this Part, I explain the importance of distinguishing descriptive and normative 
claims and give examples of some of the ways scholars fail to clearly draw the 
distinction. 
A. Opportunities for Confusion 
To see why legal scholars should be explicit about the normativity of their claims, 
notice some of the many ways two scholars who mush together their views of law 
and morality might inadvertently talk past each other: (1) they might have a factual 
disagreement about sources of law (for example, there might be precedents that one 
scholar is considering but not the other); (2) they might agree about the relevant 
sources of law but disagree about how judges are likely to interpret them; and (3) 
they might agree about both the pertinent sources of law and how judges are likely 
to interpret them but disagree about the best way to proceed from an overall moral 
perspective (because they disagree about facts, values, or both).  
Assume, for example, that a judge must give primary custody of a divorcing 
couple’s seven-year-old son to one of two parents who live several hours drive from 
each other. As a legal matter, the case turns on the “best interests” of the child, and 
we will assume those interests are in equipoise, given available evidence, with two 
possible exceptions. Professor A says that primary custody of the child “should” go 
to the father because the child has more friends who live near the father than the 
mother. Professor B says that primary custody “should” go to the mother because, 
even though there’s no evidence in the record to prove it in this particular case, she 
believes mothers are generally better nurturers than fathers, and this consideration 
dominates the issue of how many existing friendships a seven-year-old child has. 
It seems like A and B disagree about what “should” happen. But consider several 
ways in which their disagreement might just be terminological: First, A may speak 
of legal normativity while B may speak of moral normativity. When A says custody 
should go to the father, she may be making a descriptive legal claim, “the law 
requires giving custody to the father,” conjoined with the view that legal actors 
“should” reach the correct legal result. She might immediately agree that the world 
would be a morally better place if the mother had custody and that, if she were the 
judge, law be damned, she’d give custody to the mother. But when she speaks of 
“should,” she is focusing on positive law, not her views of morality. Hence, A and B 
may agree on substance but merely speak of different kinds of normativity.  
Alternatively, A and B might disagree about whether the law exhausts answers to 
moral questions in legal contexts. A might believe that, in the context of legal 
questions, judges morally ought to decide only in accordance with the law. For A, 
moral oughts in legal contexts are resolved entirely by considering legal oughts, 
while B believes that the law provides an important starting point but that it’s not the 
last word on what judges morally ought to do. B might believe that judges should 
sometimes opt for solutions that mesh poorly with the law when they lead to better 
overall results from a moral perspective. In order for A and B to resolve their conflict, 
they need to resolve a deep moral question. Arguing about child custody alone may 
never address their substantive disagreement.  
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Nevertheless, we might see several law review articles in which A and B argue 
over contract, tort, and criminal law where the issue that really divides them concerns 
a rather fundamental theoretical issue that they never actually discuss. Sometimes, 
domain-specific conflicts can help us understand broad theoretical debates, but 
sometimes they just divert us from more fundamental issues that must be addressed 
head on in order to make progress. Legal scholars often make their claims too unclear 
to know precisely where disputes ultimately lie.  
In the next three Sections, I give examples of how closer attention to the difference 
between descriptive and normative claims can improve legal scholarship. 
B. Skepticism About Moral Authority 
The pronouncements of judges, legislators, founders of the Constitution, and so 
on are not morally authoritative. You cannot say, because so-and-so says that X is 
immoral, X is immoral. There is no general agreement about who constitutes a moral 
authority and whether moral authority even exists. You could say, “This person says 
X is immoral, and assuming this person is a moral authority, X is immoral.” But now 
you’ve assumed an essential part of your argument. This is an important point 
because legal scholars frequently cite legal authorities to bolster claims about 
morality. 
Legal sources can buttress moral arguments when the legal source provides 
substantive reasons that you merely relay to the reader. For example, you can cite a 
court opinion for a point of fact, though there will often be more direct sources for 
such information. Similarly, judges may offer a cogent argument about some moral 
matter. You can cite the argument so long as you are relying on the persuasive force 
of the argument and not the identity of the person who made it. You can cite fortune 
cookies and Bazooka Joe comics in the same way. Whatever authority a judge or 
other legal source has, it is not moral authority. 
Matters get more complicated when a law references what sounds like a general 
moral standard. For example, a law might speak of “just compensation” without 
defining it. Do such laws directly incorporate a moral standard? If so, are judicial 
proclamations about that standard legally binding?  
Judicial proclamations about that standard can be legally binding; but they’re still 
not morally binding. When the law speaks of just compensation, it’s not referring to 
justice in the sense that matters for morality. It’s referring to a legal notion. One way 
we know this is that subsequent courts can modify the meaning of “just.” They can 
say things like, “For purposes of determining just compensation in such and such 
context, we consider the following four factors.” Or, “After the Supreme Court’s 
holding in such and such, we no longer consider that fourth factor in assessing just 
compensation.” Courts can alter the legal meaning of terms like “just compensation,” 
but they cannot alter what sort of compensation truly is just. Legal sources can tell 
us to count someone as three-fifths of a person for voting purposes, but they cannot 
alter the actual moral value of a person by judicial decree. The 1897 sitting of the 
Indiana General Assembly nearly passed a bill that would have set the value of pi at 
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3.2.49 Needless to say, had the bill been enacted, it would not have actually changed 
the value of pi. You can no sooner legislate truths of morality than truths of 
mathematics. 
1. Example: Godsoe Insufficiently Clear as to Kind of Authority 
In a 2015 law review article, Cynthia Godsoe argues that juveniles should not be 
prosecuted for prostitution.50 By arguing for the decriminalization of juvenile 
prostitution, she makes a moral claim in a legal context. As part of her argument, she 
claims that “[r]etributive rationales do not justify sanctioning prostituted girls as they 
are minors [and] are not deserving of punishment.”51 To support her claim that they 
do not deserve punishment, she quotes U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan: 
As Justice Kagan concluded in Miller v. Alabama: “Because ‘[t]he heart 
of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender’s blameworthiness, ‘the 
case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.’” This 
lower culpability should apply to minors prosecuted for prostitution, 
particularly those at the younger end of adolescence.52 
The appropriateness of the Kagan quote depends on precisely what Godsoe has in 
mind. If the quote were particularly eloquent or insightful as to a matter of morality, 
there would be no harm in citing it. To me, though, Kagan merely makes a bald 
assertion about a relatively uncontroversial moral claim. This raises the possibility 
that Godsoe quoted Kagan as an authority about a moral claim. Such a use would be 
suspect, as judges and justices are not moral authorities. Nevertheless, legal scholars 
frequently treat them as such. They do so, in part, because lawyers do. Lawyers cite 
legal authority for moral claims, and judges seem fine with it. For the reasons I 
discussed earlier, however, scholars are held to a higher standard.  
Maybe I’m wrong about the nature of moral authority. But at least recognize the 
need to argue for your view. So, for example, if you think you have identified 
someone who is an actual moral authority and can somehow provide evidence to 
support it, by all means, do so. But you cannot surreptitiously assume that someone 
 
 
 49. H.R. 246, 1897 Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 1897), http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/crd/Local 
gov/Second%20Level%20pages/indiana_pi_bill.htm [https://perma.cc/TM5U-J8W7] 
(asserting erroneously the “important fact [] that the ratio of the diameter and the 
circumference [of a circle] is as five-fourths to four”); see PETR BECKMANN, A HISTORY OF PI 
174–77 (5th ed. 1982). 
 50. Cynthia Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1313 (2015).  
 51. Id. at 1345. 
 52. Id. at 1345 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)). Notice that Godsoe’s 
claim morphs a bit. At first, we’re expecting an argument that prostituted girls “are not 
deserving of punishment,” but the Kagan quote endorses only the weaker claim that minors 
are less blameworthy than adults. Kagan leaves open the possibility that minors are, indeed, 
deserving of some punishment. But cf. Gideon Yaffe, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN 
AND THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 10 (2018) (arguing that children should be 
punished less than adults for identical crimes not because they are necessarily less culpable 
but because “we have constructed our institutions in such a way as to weaken the legal reasons 
that they have to refrain from crime”). 
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is a moral authority and expect careful scholars to go along. And if you succeed in 
identifying genuine moral authority, your proof will be far more important than 
whatever else you’re writing about. 
Alternatively, Godsoe could be citing Kagan’s view of the legal notion of 
blameworthiness. Words like “retribution” and “blameworthiness” sometimes factor 
into the legal analysis of sentencing in much the way I suggested “just compensation” 
could be given special legal meaning. That may be what Godsoe has in mind here, 
though I see no indication of it in her article. But if she is referring to the legal 
conception of blameworthiness, the passage would be clearer if she noted that 
explicitly.  
C. Tradition and Legal Evolution as Alleged Sources of Moral Authority  
As noted, prior laws have institutionalized slavery, treated women as property, 
and prohibited adults who love each other from getting married. The mere fact that 
something is made legal (or illegal) does not imply the value judgment that it ought 
to be. We needn’t rely on the worst of the worst laws to make the point: Several 
decades ago, most U.S. jurisdictions followed a principle of contributory 
negligence.53 Does that mean that contributory negligence was morally desirable? 
Not necessarily. Since then, jurisdictions have overwhelmingly switched to some 
form of comparative negligence.54 Does that show that comparative negligence is 
morally preferable? Not necessarily. These are just facts about decisions made by 
courts and legislators. Courts and legislators are fallible. A moral argument about 
contributory and comparative negligence must appeal to something that matters from 
a moral perspective, for example, which regime better promotes corrective justice or 
maximizes societal well-being.  
The fact that something is the law may well give us some reason for it to remain 
law. Reliance has moral value. In his defense of tradition, Edmund Burke famously 
“oppose[d] theories and abstractions, developed by individual minds, to traditions, 
built up by many minds over long periods.”55 About the French Revolution, Burke 
warned: 
The science of government being therefore so practical in itself, and 
intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, 
and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, 
however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution 
that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has 
answered in any tolerable degree, for ages the common purposes of 
society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns 
of approved utility before his eyes.56 
 
 
 53. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 467 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934). 
 54. See 57B AM. JUR. 2D NEGLIGENCE § 801 (2004). 
 55. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 369 (2006). 
 56. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND 
BURKE 451 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999).  
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In other words, Burke worried about changing established forms of government. 
We may be unable to fully appreciate the evolved stability or harmony of social and 
political arrangements, so changes to the status quo risk making things worse. 
Importantly, though, we must distinguish the fact and value components of 
arguments for traditional practices. One might be persuaded by the Burkean position 
as it pertains to matters of fact: Maybe we systematically underestimate the risks of 
social change. Maybe we are bad at designing new arrangements because we cannot 
appreciate how and why various constituencies settled on the old ones. None of these 
Burkean strands requires treating traditional rules as sources of authority on moral 
values. By contrast, we should be skeptical of claims that adopt what Cass Sunstein 
calls the “implausibly mystical” view that tradition has moral “authority over the 
present.”57 
Some theorists echo a slightly different view that the existing state of the law has 
normative authority because the law tends to evolve in ways that make it better over 
time.58 During the evolution of the common law, they might say, judicial decisions 
that were especially unpopular or economically inefficient were more likely to be 
challenged, so that, as a matter of probability, the common law tends to improve its 
outcomes from a moral perspective.59  
We should not accept such claims too quickly. First, it’s hard to know where one 
is in the course of history. Presumably, before most jurisdictions switched to 
comparative negligence, those who supported the normative value of the common 
law would have opposed the change on the ground that the common law evolved a 
system of contributory negligence. Indeed, a view that favors tradition may slow 
down the very evolution it celebrates. Second, even proponents would likely admit, 
the approach sometimes leads to the wrong results. For example, many of the laws 
restricting the property rights of women emerged from the common law.60 How can 
 
 
 57. Sunstein, supra note 55, at 407. 
 58. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 J. 
CONST. L. 387, 391 (2008) (noting the view); cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241,1251–52 
(2015) (explaining how “the common law’s normative goals can change over time” while 
doctrine retains a static “jural” meaning, in order to “contribute[] to the ‘growth,’ ‘evolution,’ 
and flexibility of the common law over time”).  
 59. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977).  
 60. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614–15 (1910) (emphasis added) (“At the 
common law the husband and wife were regarded as one. The legal existence of the wife 
during coverture was merged in that of the husband; and, generally speaking, the wife was 
incapable of making contracts, of acquiring property or disposing of the same without her 
husband’s consent. They could not enter into contracts with each other, nor were they liable 
for torts committed by one against the other. In pursuance of a more liberal policy in favor of 
the wife, statutes have been passed in many of the States looking to the relief of a married 
woman from the disabilities imposed upon her as a feme covert by the common law. Under 
these laws she has been empowered to control and dispose of her own property free from the 
constraint of the husband, in many instances to carry on trade and business, and to deal with 
third persons as though she were a single woman. The wife has further been enabled by the 
passage of such statutes to sue for trespass upon her rights in property, and to protect the 
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we know when we’re dealing with the good kind of legal evolution? Third, we can 
question whether the moral improvement that purportedly underlies legal evolution, 
often framed in terms of economic efficiency, constitutes the view of morality that 
we really care about. For example, the forces shaping the law’s evolution may have 
emerged from unjust preexisting social structures. 
But as with most of what I’m saying, you can make your assumptions explicit and 
proceed accordingly. A scholar could simply assume that tradition is a source of 
moral norms, cite whatever literature is supposed to support the claim, and get on 
with it. It’s critical, though, to make the assumption explicit to alert readers that they 
may need to seriously discount the author’s conclusions. Moreover, making the 
assumption explicit helps avoid a common problem in legal literature where scholars 
criticize one aspect of law by citing another. Such approaches can be puzzling. If one 
body of law holds substantive moral weight by virtue of its being law, why doesn’t 
the other? Hence, to make morally normative arguments about the law, one must 
refer not to legal authority but to moral normativity.  
1. Example: Burke May Use Law as a Moral Justification for Law 
Another Burke, Alafair Burke, has written about Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure law.61 As interpreted, the amendment provides that people are not 
constitutionally protected from police searches of their bodies, cars, or houses when 
they consent to a search, provided police do not use impermissibly coercive tactics 
to obtain consent.62 Burke argues that the Fourth Amendment should be more 
demanding than that. She believes that searches should not only require voluntary 
consent but also “bear a reasonable relationship to the government’s need for 
engaging in” the search.63 And she offers a number of thoughtful policy reasons in 
defense of the approach she advocates.64 So far so good. 
Burke also argues that the Supreme “Court has lost sight of the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment itself.”65 In many areas of Fourth Amendment law, we ask whether 
police conduct was reasonable based on “an express weighing of the governmental 
 
 
security of her person against the wrongs and assaults of others.”). 
 61. See Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 509 (2015). 
 62. See id. at 512, 514. 
 63. Id. at 562. 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 544–51. There is certainly a risk that police will exploit opportunities 
to conduct consent searches. Consider the advice of Vernon Riddick, Waterbury, Connecticut 
police chief, speaking to a primarily African-American church as one news source reported it: 
“If an officer stops your car, if they ask to search your person or vehicle, if they demand entry 
into your home, comply and then complain later to the department’s internal affairs office and 
police chief’s office if you feel your rights have been violated, Riddick said.” Michael Puffer, 
Waterbury Chief: ‘Let’s Cooperate’, REPUBLICAN AM. ARCHIVES (July 14, 2016), 
https://archives.rep-am.com/2016/07/14/waterbury-chief-lets-cooperate/ [https://perma.cc 
/7WJM-TGER]; see also Radley Balko, Refusing a Search Is a Right, Not a Provocation, 
WASHINGTON POST (July 19, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.washington post.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2016/07/19/refusing-a-search-is-a-right-not-a-provocation [https://perma.cc/W54T 
-TCAM]. 
 65. Burke, supra note 61, at 515. 
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and citizen interests at stake.”66 Calling it “macro reasonableness,”67 she argues that 
courts should look to a high-level “balancing [of] the interests of law enforcement 
against the level of intrusion to the individual.”68 According to Burke, this analysis 
underlies the Fourth Amendment’s Terry doctrine that allows police officers to 
conduct an investigatory stop and search of a person without a warrant and without 
probable cause when they have “reasonable suspicion” that crime is afoot.69 She 
believes this analysis is at the heart of other Fourth Amendment “doctrinal rules 
governing special needs searches, roadblocks, administrative searches, community 
caretaking searches, inventory searches, protective sweeps, searches incident to 
arrest, and an officer’s directives that drivers or passengers exit a vehicle during a 
traffic stop.”70 
But what relevance do Fourth Amendment doctrines unrelated to consent have for 
the one she is focused on? As a descriptive matter, Burke is under no misimpression 
that the consent-search doctrine actually requires the reasonableness test she 
recommends. Indeed, she criticizes the Supreme Court, the highest body authorized 
to interpret the Fourth Amendment, for not using it71 and cites no lower court 
authority that does. While she does make occasional reference to the textual 
protection in the amendment against “‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures,”72 she 
does not appear to make the legal argument that the text itself requires the sort of 
macro reasonableness analysis she defends. 
While I can’t rule out the possibility that Burke is making a legal claim, it seems 
like she is really making a moral claim, and she does indeed offer several moral 
arguments in favor of her position. It’s not clear, however, that her moral claim gains 
anything by discussing positive law. Just because Test A is used a lot by the Supreme 
Court and Test B is rarely used doesn’t mean that Test A is morally better. Test B is 
at no disadvantage from a moral perspective simply because it contravenes a test that 
is used more frequently in other domains. Rather, the value of Test B depends on 
substantive moral arguments. There may be some simplicity or other rule-of-law 
values promoted by using the same test in lots of contexts. But the more common 
test does not have substantive moral authority simply because it has been adopted 
more frequently (absent argument that the Court generally gets moral matters right).  
Moral matters must be settled on moral grounds. Burke cannot rely on Supreme 
Court precedent to establish her moral argument. Given that positive law provides 
only the weakest support for her descriptive legal claim, she can’t much rely on the 
current state of the law to get her constitutional view accepted in court. Maybe she 
included the discussion of other aspects of Fourth Amendment doctrine because 
some voices in the academy would bemoan a Fourth Amendment paper with no close 
connection to current Supreme Court doctrine. But whether those voices are right or 
 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 536. Burke links her distinction to Orin Kerr’s distinction between micro- and 
macro-scale inquiries. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 503, 523 (2007). 
 68. Burke, supra note 61, at 536–37. 
 69. Id. at 537–39. 
 70. Id. at 539–40 (footnotes omitted). 
 71. Id. at 514–15. 
 72. E.g., id. at 514; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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not, Burke’s discussion likely only pays lip service to the expectation anyhow. While 
it’s possible that I’ve missed the true aims of Burke’s article, this very risk counsels 
in favor of being more explicit about how one’s doctrinal discussion bears on one’s 
moral or legal claims. 
D. Addressing Moral Magnitude 
Since moral arguments can rely on neither moral nor legal authority, they must 
generally rely on a solid moral theory or part of a theory. If you think tort law is 
justified only to the extent that it promotes corrective justice, you will often reach 
different conclusions about what we morally ought to do than if you think tort law is 
justified only to the extent that it promotes economic efficiency. And these views can 
lead to different conclusions than the view that tort law is justified by both 
considerations. If you have no normative grounds for evaluating tort law, then it is 
not obvious how you can construct any normative claim about tort law. 
Good scholarship is about more than just expressing a preference or offering a 
vote: “I think it would be better if we had a no-fault system for automobile 
accidents.” Rather, we want to know what supports your views about no-fault 
compensation and how the principles underlying your view apply in other contexts 
where the same issues are at play. If I’m merely seeking an opinion, I can ask my 
non-scholar Aunt Sally. If I turn to scholarship, I want a carefully reasoned argument 
of general applicability. 
When I say that your argument needs a solid theoretical basis, I mean that you 
need to spend time thinking about theory; what has to go into a paper depends on its 
thesis. For example, on some tort law issue, your recommendation might increase 
both corrective justice and economic efficiency relative to the status quo. If you claim 
that your proposal is better than the status quo, then you may well have satisfied the 
theoretical concerns of a wide swath of scholars without having to settle any 
particular theoretical issue.73 Similarly, you could restrict the scope of your thesis: 
“Assuming a corrective justice theory of tort law,” here’s what follows. Attending to 
theory doesn’t mean your work must focus on theory; it just means that you’ve 
addressed at least as much theory as is required to defend your particular thesis.  
 
 
 73. In prior work, I have argued that, whether one is a consequentialist or a retributivist 
about punishment, one is obligated to consider the subjective experience of punishment when 
sentencing. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
182 (2009). At a workshop, George Fletcher stated that he was ill-at-ease with my paper 
because I never took a side as to whether I was a retributivist or a consequentialist. Professor 
George Fletcher, Remarks at the Columbia Legal Theory Workshop (Sept. 8, 2008). To me, 
however, it is a virtue of the piece that it is agnostic between these two theories. There is no 
shortage of papers that pick a punishment theory and deliver a conclusion on the assumption 
that the theory is correct. Far fewer papers purport to deliver the same general conclusion with 
respect to either major theory of punishment. 
2020] HOW TO FIX LEGAL SCHOLARMUSH  1221 
 
1. Example: Stinneford Needs More Attention to Theory and Moral Magnitude 
In “Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishment,”74 John Stinneford argues that 
jurisdictions have too much power to divide criminal conduct into individual crimes, 
each of which carries a significant minimum penalty.75 He makes both a moral claim 
and a legal claim. On the moral side, he argues that dividing conduct into lots of little 
convictions leads to excessive punishment. On the legal side, he argues that the 
Constitution should be (and used to be) interpreted in a manner that precludes this 
injustice. 
Most of Stinneford’s article is devoted to the legal issue. He argues that “prior to 
the twentieth century, judges used the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, and the rule of strict construction of penal statutes to 
prevent the government from dividing the unit of prosecution in order to impose 
excessive punishments.”76 Stinneford’s thesis appears to be that “[b]y recovering 
[our former] methodology for addressing prosecutorial efforts to divide crime and 
multiply punishments, we can ameliorate our current mass incarceration crisis and 
make the American criminal justice system more just.”77 When Stinneford tells us 
that we should “recover” earlier meanings of constitutional protections against 
excessive punishment, however, he acknowledges that his favored approach does not 
reflect current law.78 So without claiming the mantle of current law, it seems that 
Stinneford is arguing for a change in the law—indeed a change in constitutional 
law—that will presumably have to rely heavily on moral arguments (to amend the 
Constitution or to interpret it in a manner at odds with current law).  
To support his moral claim, Stinneford focuses on the case of Weldon Angelos 
who sold eight ounces of marijuana to a government informant on three occasions.79 
On two of those occasions, Angelos had a pistol on him or in his car, though he never 
held or brandished it.80 When he was arrested, police found additional contraband in 
his home and other locations, including about three pounds of marijuana, over 
$18,000 in cash, and several handguns.81 At trial, Angelos was convicted of 
distributing marijuana and of three counts of possessing a firearm during a drug 
transaction.82 Given his several convictions, Angelos was sentenced to fifty-five 
years and one day of incarceration, the minimum legally permissible sentence.83 His 
sentencing judge stated that: 
Mr. Angelos will receive a far longer sentence than those imposed in the 
federal system for such major crimes as aircraft hijacking, second-degree 
 
 
 74. John F. Stinneford, Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1955 (2015). 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 1957. 
 76. Id. at 1958. 
 77. Id. at 1955–56. 
 78. Id. at 1955–56, 1961, 1968, 2010–11. 
 79. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (D. Utah 2004).  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1232. 
 83. Id. at 1230. 
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murder, racial beating inflicting life-threatening injuries, kidnapping, 
and rape. Indeed, Mr. Angelos will receive a far longer sentence than 
those imposed for three aircraft hijackings, three second-degree murders, 
three racial beatings inflicting life-threatening injuries, three 
kidnappings, and three rapes.84 
Note that the general setup of Stinneford’s article should sound familiar. Here’s a 
moral problem, a case that illustrates it, and a legal solution. Thousands of articles 
use a similar setup.  
To make his moral case, Stinneford strongly implies that Angelos’s sentence was 
unjustly excessive. To be sure, the sentence seems awfully long. Still, Stinneford’s 
argument would benefit from a clearer theory as to why Angelos’s punishment is 
unjust; as far as I can tell, he never offers one.  
Stinneford’s views seem most consistent with the retributivist tradition, which 
focuses on whether an offender’s sentence is proportional to his blameworthiness.85 
But no one has ever given a widely accepted account of how to calculate proportional 
punishment. I, for one, have argued that the entire notion of proportional punishment 
doesn’t stand up to close scrutiny.86 But even if we grant that Angelos’s punishment 
is excessive from a moral perspective (as it seems to be), Stinneford’s thesis is 
supposed to apply not just to Angelos but to many other defendants whose conduct 
is divided by prosecutors into many pieces. If Stinneford were only worried about 
Angelos, he could at most show that the President should commute Angelos’s 
sentence. Stinneford, however, seeks to alter our treatment of many offenders.  
Stinneford’s moral argument is too weak to apply to offenders generally because, 
like much of legal scholarship, it suffers from what I call the “moral magnitude” 
problem. Stinneford needs to give us some measure of how much injustice he is 
addressing. It matters for the same basic reason that blocks the inference from 
adultery’s immorality to its criminality. Merely identifying an injustice is insufficient 
to demonstrate that a major change in law (let alone constitutional interpretation) is 
warranted.  
For example, Stinneford never tells us how often the current system gets what he 
would deem a just result relative to what he’d deem an unjust result. He never tells 
us whether or how often the constitutional interpretation he supports would lead to 
underpunishment or to other changes in the conduct of legislators or prosecutors. 
Even some retributivists may believe that we should tolerate some punishment 
inaccuracy if we ordinarily reach the right result. Again, we cannot assess the 
strength of the injustice absent further argument. 
 
 
 84. Id. at 1258.  
 85. See Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 
972 (2000) (“[R]etributive beliefs only require that culpable wrongdoers be given their just 
deserts by being made to suffer (or to receive a hardship or deprivation).”); cf. MICHAEL 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME 78–79, 88 (1997).  
 86. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjectivist Critique of Proportionality, in THE PALGRAVE 
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 571 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan eds., 2019); see also Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 1141 (2013). 
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To establish moral magnitude, Stinneford would ideally tell us how much 
injustice there was in Angelos’s sentence, and more importantly, how much injustice 
occurs annually as a result of piecemeal prosecution. Then, we could try to compare 
the relative amount of injustice we would expect were the Constitution interpreted in 
the ways he recommends. Notice that this sort of analysis is frequently absent from 
legal scholarship. To be sure, it is difficult to conduct. But scholars ought to address 
it in some way. Perhaps Stinneford could make some simplifying assumptions or 
estimates. Even if he couldn’t, he could surely note that his claim depends on fact 
and value claims that he doesn’t defend in the paper.  
Stinneford might believe, along with typical retributivists, that it is never 
acceptable to knowingly overpunish someone.87 Such a view might ease his burden 
of empirical investigation, since the Angelos case itself arguably implicates the 
injustice of knowing overpunishment. But he never makes that claim in the paper, 
and it’s not obvious that we should never knowingly overpunish, especially if doing 
so would substantially reduce crime. Moreover, a large-scale system of criminal 
justice will arguably require some instances of knowing overpunishment if it hopes 
to cabin judicial discretion.  
Stinneford’s argument is on particularly shaky ground to the extent he is making 
an argument of constitutional proportions. If his moral argument succeeds, we may 
well have reason to vote for laws that reduce prosecutors’ ability to stack offenses in 
the way Stinneford bemoans. But Stinneford has to make an argument powerful 
enough to override our ordinary principles of majority voting. Hence, the magnitude 
problem is particularly serious here. Without a clear sense of the magnitude of the 
injustice Stinneford addresses, it’s difficult to assess the argument that we need to 
invoke anti-majoritarian constitutional protections.  
None of this is meant to challenge the conclusion that the world would be a much 
better place with the constitutional protections Stinneford advocates. What I’m 
challenging are automatic inferences in legal scholarship from the claim that 
behavior is morally problematic to the conclusion that we ought to make it illegal, 
criminal, or unconstitutional. 
Moreover, if Stinneford’s moral argument is grounded in retributivism, he should 
wrestle with the fact that many punishment theorists are consequentialists who focus 
on deterring crime and incapacitating and rehabilitating offenders.88 Stinneford never 
addresses consequentialist concerns. And while it may seem obvious that Angelos’s 
sentence overdeters or wastes resources, the reality is more complicated. Angelos 
had the opportunity to plead guilty and receive a recommended sentence of fifteen 
years.89 So at least he was given the option of accepting a less onerous punishment. 
Under the storybook view of criminal justice, the right to trial should not be 
undermined by excessive prosecutorial leverage, and the leverage here certainly 
seems excessive: the government indicated that if Angelos proceeded to trial it would 
seek a superseding indictment that could have led to a mandatory prison sentence of 
 
 
 87. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY 6, 102 n.33 (2009). 
 88. See C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 7–
8 (1987).  
 89. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. 
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more than one hundred years.90 But beyond the bounds of this particular case, it is 
not immediately obvious what kinds of leverage are excessive, particularly if one 
holds a consequentialist perspective on prosecutorial discretion.  
Consequentialists would also like more empirical information to assess 
Stinneford’s concerns: How does sentence length affect offense rates? How often do 
firearms lead to violence in drug transactions? How would these numbers likely 
change under Stinneford’s proposal? The list of empirical questions 
consequentialists care about is enormous but is essentially unaddressed by 
Stinneford. He could simply assume a retributivist perspective, but if he does, he 
should be more explicit and recognize that doing so will limit the scope of his 
conclusions.  
Another reason to address the moral magnitude problem is that we live in a world 
of limited resources. We must often decide not just whether some policy leads to 
unjust results but how bad the policy is in a world of competing priorities. Are there 
never cases when prosecutors need to multiply piecemeal punishments in order to 
punish appropriately? Stinneford doesn’t discuss the matter. Might legislators have 
selected sentences for decades based on courts’ current approach to the pertinent 
constitutional doctrines such that politicians might make sentences more onerous 
were Stinneford to make constitutional interpretation more defendant friendly? Can 
we be confident that the change Stinneford seeks won’t have any bad or at least 
unpredictable political responses? We’re simply given no analysis one way or the 
other. Stinneford seeks a major change to several important aspects of constitutional 
law, and we need some measure of the problem (ideally on the national level) so we 
know how critical it is to fix.  
Of course, it’s difficult to find some of the data that could support Stinneford’s 
claim. And not everyone wants to focus their talents on data collection and analysis. 
Still, more explicitly recognizing argumentative gaps and assumptions helps readers 
understand an argument’s contours, including its weaknesses, and suggests places 
for further research perhaps by those who specialize in data collection and analysis.  
Again, at no time have I disagreed with Stinneford’s claim that current 
prosecutorial charging practices lead to injustice. Indeed, the article makes for a 
useful example precisely because its underlying moral assumption seems so 
attractive. But scholars should question their assumptions and be careful not to ease 
an argumentative burden simply because the argument jibes with their inclinations. 
The shortcomings that I’ve identified should not be pinned on Stinneford. Quite 
the opposite. They should be pinned on legal scholarship more generally which 
regularly allows the concerns I’ve raised to silently slip by. Some of these concerns 
can be easily addressed: carefully watching the scope of our claims, paying attention 
to our underlying moral theories. Some cannot: gathering hard-to-obtain data, 
quantifying matters that are difficult to quantify. But as legal scholars get better at 
the former, they can more carefully focus attention on the latter and push the 
boundaries of what legal scholarship is able to accomplish. 
 
 
 90. Id. at 1232. 
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IV. SCHOLARSHIP VERSUS PRACTICE 
Part of the reason legal scholars fail to clearly distinguish descriptive and 
normative claims is that they focus more on the “legal” part of their title than the 
“scholar” part. Almost all legal scholars trained as lawyers rather than scholars, and 
they fall back on approaches better suited to the profession they trained for. 
Nevertheless, scholars must recognize the descriptive-normative distinction if they 
hope to make clear, theoretically-sound arguments. Arguments that are neither clear 
nor theoretically sound have limited practical value no matter how well attuned they 
are to real-world legal issues.  
A. Why Legal Scholars Mush Their Claims Together 
There are several reasons why legal scholars mush their descriptive and normative 
claims together. First, we do too little to make the distinction clear to law students, 
so when they become lawyers and ultimately law professors, they haven’t been 
trained to make the appropriate distinction or to recognize its importance.  
Second, it’s very difficult to combine the weight of law-related moral 
considerations with the weight of moral considerations unrelated to law. So legal 
scholars throw their hands up and speak about law and morality as though there’s no 
difference. Though the task is surely difficult, the weight of different kinds of 
considerations can be at least roughly combined.91 Legal scholars should rise to the 
challenge of addressing such tasks rather than simply ignoring them.  
A third and particularly noteworthy reason scholars mush together their 
descriptive and normative claims is that they see judges and lawyers do it all the time. 
Based on their legal training, scholars think that claims about what the law is often 
sound more persuasive than claims about what the law ought to be, and they seek the 
same rhetorical effect that judges and lawyers seek. Law professors mistakenly 
believe that scholarly discussions of law are similar to discussions of law in court. 
They fail to recognize that the job of a scholar is very different than the job of a judge 
or a lawyer; scholars have more demanding requirements of clarity, transparency, 
and rigor.  
As I’ve mentioned, lawyers are sometimes professionally obligated to be 
insincere, and many judges, no doubt, are insincere, writing as though the law is 
perfectly clear even when it was not prior to the judge’s opinion. Surely some judges 
take their opinions to be sincere. But I hope judges are frequently insincere when 
they make confident assertions about legitimately disputed issues because the 
alternative is that they are simply overconfident in their abilities and sorely unable 
to recognize genuine indeterminacy.  
Indeed, it makes national headlines when federal judges are honest enough about 
their own abilities to admit making a mistake. When Judge Richard Posner expressed 
regret over a decision he authored in an important voter identification law case that 
he participated in six years prior, a New York Times article stated: “It is the kind of 
thought that rarely passes the lips of a member of the federal judiciary: I was 
 
 
 91. See Adam J. Kolber, Line Drawing in the Dark, 22 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 
(forthcoming 2021) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
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wrong.”92 But, of course, we shouldn’t be surprised when a person who has decided 
as many cases as Judge Posner has some regrets. What’s a bit more surprising is that 
a judge (though in this case, as much an academic as a judge) has fessed up to a 
regret. Interestingly, the particular admission here was rather modest: Posner largely 
attributed the court’s error to factual information not provided at the time of the 
decision.93 
Judge Nancy Gertner, now retired from the federal bench and affiliated with 
Harvard Law School,94 has provided a glimpse into how judges craft opinions in 
ways that massage their underlying views. In a 2014 law journal, she wrote about 
Damien Perry, a convicted drug conspirator she sentenced in 2000.95 Perry had a 
troubled upbringing, and at age sixteen, about five years prior to his sentencing, he 
and a friend were playing with a gun when it accidentally fired and shot Perry in the 
head, causing Perry to lose his left eye.96 The bullet remained in his head, causing 
severe headaches, occasional seizures, and considerable psychological trauma.97 
At his sentencing for drug-related activities, the government recommended 135 
to 168 months’ imprisonment,98 though Gertner considered his activities 
comparatively minor and would have liked him to receive only probation.99 Sitting 
at a time when federal sentencing guidelines were understood to be mandatory, 
Gertner lamented Perry’s treatment under the guidelines.100 She seemed pleased to 
find a reason, any reason I think she candidly implies in a law journal, to reduce his 
sentence:101  
Although the Guidelines were mandatory, I worked mightily to interpret 
them in as humane a way as I could. There was a little used category for 
“extraordinary physical condition” under the Guidelines that enabled a 
departure. To protect against reversal, I wrote a lengthy opinion about 
the category “extraordinary physical condition,” and how it applied to 
Damien. . . . Guideline-speak obliged me to write about “bullets in the 
brain,” Damien’s “extraordinary physical circumstances.” I wrote 
“Damien Perry has a bullet in his brain. The question is whether that is 
 
 
 92. John Schwartz, Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/politics/judge-in-landmark-case-dis 
avows-support-for-voter-id.html [https://perma.cc/E42Q-NHY5]. 
 93. Id.; see also Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST (Oct. 
26, 1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/10/26/powell-regrets-
backing-sodomy-law/a1ae2efc-bec6-47ec-bfb6-1c098e610c5b/ [https://perma.cc/UX3Z-
BYRW] (expressing Justice Powell’s regret that he voted against finding a fundamental 
constitutional right to same-sex sexual conduct). 
 94. Nancy Gertner, How to Talk About Sentencing Policy—and Not Disparity, 46 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 313, 313 (2014). 
 95. Id. at 320–26. 
 96. Id. at 321. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 320–22. 
 99. Id. at 323. 
 100. Id. at 320–26. 
 101. Id. 
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an extraordinary physical circumstance sufficient to warrant a downward 
departure. To ask the question, is to answer it.”102 
I think her description in the law journal reflects a heavily results-oriented 
approach to sentencing. Her focus is on how to reduce Perry’s sentence much more 
than it is on the niceties of interpreting the sentencing guidelines. One reason I say 
this is that, even if the downward departure was correct as a matter of law, it’s no 
slam dunk. Hence, her judicial opinion seemed to speak hyperbolically when it 
stated, “To ask the question, is to answer it.”103 Indeed, its hyperbolic nature is 
revealed by the fact that she follows it up with actual legal discussion. But it’s 
noteworthy that her position is much more open and direct in the law journal than in 
her judicial opinion.104 She states quite frankly in the law journal that she would have 
liked to give Perry only probation, but she “knew that if [she] had departed from the 
Guidelines to that degree, the First Circuit would have reversed [her] in a 
nanosecond.”105  
By no means am I here criticizing either Judge Gertner’s judicial opinion or her 
journal article. I make no claim that judicial opinions ought to reflect scholarly values 
of openness and transparency.106 Perhaps Gertner should be commended for her 
heroic handling of Damien Perry’s sentence. Quite possibly, judicial insincerity and 
overconfidence have positive effects. Perhaps they make laypeople think that they 
live in an orderly world, increase their satisfaction with the judiciary, and make 
litigating parties feel like justice was served. Or maybe they have none of those 
effects. My point is that there is probably quite a bit of judicial insincerity and 
overconfidence, and even if they have a place in the legal system, they are qualities 
at odds with good scholarship.  
Scholars are supposed to make objective claims, voiced with appropriate caution. 
Whatever rhetorical benefits scholars hope to gain by treating “ought” assertions as 
“is” assertions are dramatically outweighed by the concomitant loss of clarity, 
transparency, and rigor. And relative to most judges, scholars have considerably 
more control over their time, tasks, and workloads. Judges must often opine on 
matters about which they lack deep expertise,107 while scholars should generally 
avoid doing so. Scholars should take the time to investigate factual, conceptual, and 
 
 
 102. Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted).  
 103. In the opinion itself, though, Judge Gertner wrote, “To ask the question is almost to 
answer it.” United States v. Lacy, 99 F. Supp. 2d 108, 118 (D. Mass. 2000) (emphasis added), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Dedrick, 16 F. App’x 10 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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a gun . . . [and it] accidently fired.” Gertner, supra note 93, at 321. In her legal opinion, by 
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injury. 
 105. Gertner, supra note 93, at 323. 
 106. See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision 
Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091 (2010). 
 107. See Adam J. Kolber, Supreme Judicial Bullshit, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 141 (2018). 
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normative matters so that their scholarship can be open and transparent without 
feigning overconfidence or mushing together conceptually different claims for 
rhetorical effect. Legal scholarship should be held to a higher standard of clarity, 
transparency, and rigor than legal or judicial practice. 
B. Judicial Criticism of Theoretical Scholarship 
Many have criticized normative legal scholarship for being too theoretical and 
impractical.108 In a much-cited law review article, Harry Edwards, a judge on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued that law schools emphasize 
“abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy”109 and 
criticized law schools that “ignore or disparage legal doctrine.”110 More recently, he 
has written that law reviews have internalized “law schools’ preferences for obscure 
philosophical and theory-laden material.”111  
Edwards does recognize “the importance of theory in legal scholarship”112 when 
it also addresses doctrine: 
“Practical” scholarship, as I envision it, is not wholly doctrinal. Rather, 
in my view, a good “practical” scholar gives due weight to cases, statutes 
and other authoritative texts, but also employs theory to criticize 
doctrine, to resolve problems that doctrine leaves open, and to propose 
changes in the law or in systems of justice. Ideally, the “practical” 
scholar always integrates theory with doctrine. Moreover, I am not 
opposed to “impractical” legal scholarship, as long as law professors are 
well suited to produce it (I see no reason why law professors should write 
mediocre economics, or philosophy, or literary criticism, when arts and 
sciences professors could be doing a better job), and as long as other law 
professors continue to do “practical” work. In the ideal law faculty, there 
is a healthy balance of theory and doctrine.113 
Edwards and I have much to agree on: law professors should not write scholarship 
that is either obscure or mediocre; indeed, their writing should be as clear, interesting, 
and original as is reasonably possible. Neither law schools nor legal scholarship 
should ignore or disparage legal doctrine; legal doctrine is obviously important not 
only to the judicial system but also to legal scholarship and a high-quality legal 
education. (Indeed, one way to reduce scholarmush is to relieve those who prefer to 
be doctrinal scholars from the perceived obligation to write normative scholarship.) 
But Edwards seems unnecessarily skeptical of theoretical scholarship that fails to 
address cases and statutes. There are universal features of law and morality worthy 
of study that transcend time and place in ways that cases and statutes do not. I would 
 
 
 108. See supra note 5. 
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 110. Id. at 39. 
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welcome theoretical insights from centuries-old legal scholars, even if they have no 
case citations. Let the same be said of our own work centuries from now.  
Besides, scholars that are good at advancing theory should do that; those good at 
applying theory to doctrine should do that; and those good at both should do both. 
Not everything that’s important to say needs to come from the word processor of a 
single author. We don’t decry the split among scientists who focus on theory and 
those who focus on practical applications. There’s a division of skills and labor. 
As for Edwards’ view that “legal scholars should do a better job in producing 
scholarship that is of interest and use to wider audiences in society,”114 I have no 
quarrel with the general point but disagree on the specifics. Often what we need to 
make practical decisions is more theory. The strength of Stinneford’s moral claim, 
for example, might well turn on whether one is a consequentialist, a retributivist, or 
a combination of both. Each of these possibilities can lead to different policy 
recommendations. There is often no practical way to make decisions without deep 
theoretical commitments. We must attend to theory in order to be practical. 
C. Potential Objections 
1. Is This Article Normative Legal Scholarship? 
Some readers might wonder whether this very Article observes the distinction 
between the descriptive and the normative. The answer is that it has no need to. While 
this piece discusses morally normative legal scholarship, it is not itself morally 
normative legal scholarship. I make no claims about what scholars morally ought to 
do, let alone what they morally ought to do in some legal context.  
The form of normativity contained herein is the normativity addressing good 
scholarship. I argue that, good scholarship should clearly distinguish descriptive and 
normative claims. But I am not arguing that the failure to do so is morally wrong. 
Maybe it is morally wrong to write poor scholarship when doing so wastes valuable 
resources, but that’s a topic for another day. Still, since this Article is a form of 
scholarship, it is subject to norms of consistency, transparency, rigor, and so on. 
2. Why Should You Trust My Scholarly Values? 
I could have called this Article, “A Vision of Legal Scholarship.” It does, indeed, 
reflect my vision of the field and not everyone will share it. But the claim is stronger 
than just that. I have focused on scholarly values that I think almost all scholars 
already support—values like consistency, transparency, and rigor. So if you already 
share these values, I hope to have shown that you will better achieve them by clearly 
distinguishing the descriptive and the normative. As for the small number of scholars 
who, for some reason, do not prize these values, I hope that I have shown sufficient 
risk of pointless scholarly debates in a way that will persuade them to adopt these 
values so we can improve scholarly dialogue and avoid meaningless squabbles.  
To be sure, scholarly values must sometimes be traded off against each other. For 
example, one scholarly value is concision. When we evaluate scholarship, we should 
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care about the quality and quantity of interesting ideas per unit time it takes to read 
it. As a rough approximation, an eighty-page paper should have twice the scholarly 
value of a forty-page paper.115 So there are tradeoffs among scholarly values, 
including the values of concision and rigor. Similarly, one might sacrifice 
transparency for epiphanic impact.116 On rare occasions, scholarship sacrifices 
transparency to make its point through humor, exaggeration, or eccentricity.117 No 
one said that scholarship must fit a cookie cutter mold. With several thousand law 
review articles published each year, we can surely appreciate creative, out-of-the-
box approaches among the lot. The requirement to sharply draw the line between 
facts and values can admit some exceptions, but deviations from good scholarly 
norms will benefit from deeper care and feeding of the norms themselves. 
3. What About Scholar-Advocates and Public Intellectuals? 
Many legal scholars write scholarship aimed at nonscholar audiences.118 They 
might write amici for courts, white papers for government bodies, and editorials for 
the general public. Must these scholars worry about the normative/descriptive 
distinction? Isn’t there a role for the scholar-advocate and the public intellectual to 
simply reach out to the public? 
Advocacy per se is not inconsistent with scholarship. Indeed, all scholars should 
be advocates of their theses. What matters is the nature of the advocacy. So long as 
their work reflects values like consistency, transparency, and rigor, scholar-
advocates may indeed advocate and produce good scholarship simultaneously. While 
one cannot accomplish as much in a short newspaper editorial as a long law review 
article, concision is a scholarly value and, as noted, we can often tolerate less rigor 
and factual support in a short piece. A short editorial might effectively serve as a 
kind of abstract for more extended scholarly discussion. 
Concerns arise, however, when scholars sacrifice scholarly values as part of their 
advocacy. If the advocacy is meant to constitute scholarship, they must observe the 
fact-value distinction. Violating it fails to maximize scholarly value. At the same 
time, fishing, crocheting, and playing video games also fail to maximize scholarly 
value. Not everything a good scholar-citizen does needs to be scholarship. It is 
 
 
 115. Law review articles are often impenetrably long. As Scott Shapiro half-jokes, “In the 
history of scholarship, no reader has ever wanted an article to be longer.” Scott Shapiro 
(@scottjshapiro), TWITTER (Dec. 20, 2019, 5:53 PM), https://twitter.com/scottjshapiro/status/
1208158469234274307 [https://perma.cc/W77M-R7XM]. It is frustrating when an eighty-
page paper only truly starts defending its thesis on page sixty, and even more frustrating when, 
after trudging through sixty pages, the arguments supporting the thesis do not warrant the time 
already invested. 
 116. See, e.g., Horace Miner, Body Ritual Among the Nacirema, 58 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 
503 (1956).  
 117. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012); Pierre Schlag, 
Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the 
State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009). 
 118. See Susan N. Herman, Balancing the Five Hundred Hats: On Being a Legal 
Educator/Scholar/Activist, 41 TULSA L. REV. 637 (2006). 
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helpful, though, to alert readers, if it’s not already obvious, when an author is striving 
to maximize scholarly value and when not.  
Also, many nonscholars and non-scholarly organizations cozy up to scholars to 
promote various causes, hoping to gain an air of objectivity and legitimacy in the 
process.119 This makes the scholar-as-advocate-or-public-intellectual a bit 
dangerous. It’s one thing to give special weight to a scholarly opinion in light of the 
scholars’ factual expertise in some field. But it is quite another to give special value 
to their opinions when they are not even acting in a true scholarly capacity. 
I have heard many scholars present papers in crowded rooms in which they admit 
withholding or changing arguments contrary to their own preferences out of 
consideration for various audiences, such as judges or legislators. Doing so isn’t 
necessarily a major scholarly faux pas; it depends on how the changes relate to the 
author’s thesis. But it is sometimes a serious dereliction of scholarly duty, and the 
fact that scholars so readily admit to sacrificing their scholarly values should give us 
pause. Trading one scholarly value for another is part of the art of scholarship, but 
trading a scholarly value for a non-scholarly value, unsurprisingly, reduces total 
scholarly value. 
Importantly, advocacy that is flawed from a scholarly perspective may still make 
the world a morally better place. By lacking consistency, rigor, and transparency, 
some scholars may more persuasively convince judges and other legal actors to 
behave in ways that are morally preferable. If so, these scholars may be not only 
morally permitted but morally obligated to ignore scholarly values. But note that the 
quality of their scholarship will pay the price if it reflects less consistency, rigor, and 
transparency than it otherwise would. Egregiously confusing the normative and the 
descriptive may not make you a bad person, but it might make you a bad scholar. 
4. What Is the Weakest Part of This Article? 
The most important question you never hear asked at faculty workshops is “What 
is the weakest part of your draft?” Of those in the room, the speaker will often be the 
one best positioned to answer. Directly addressing weaknesses promotes a culture in 
which we are more upfront about claims that need improvement. Much as scientific 
research strives to identify research limitations, legal scholarship should do the same. 
Were I asked about the weakest portion of this Article, I would say that I make 
many assertions about the kinds of errors legal scholars engage in and only give a 
small number of suggestive examples. I claim, for example, that Waldron has been 
cloudy about normativity, Godsoe and Burke about moral and legal authority, and 
Stinneford about the theory underlying his arguments. I also identified some of my 
own mistakes and unnecessary ambiguities, and I suspect that the Article could be 
populated with many more mea culpas. But these are just a few data points. A 
stronger case could be made with more thorough empirical analysis. For example, 
one could examine a hundred law review articles and score them along various 
criteria associated with the fact-value distinction. That would help us better measure 
 
 
 119. See Eric Lipton & Brooke Williams, How Think Tanks Amplify Corporate America’s 
Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/us/politics/think-
tanks-research-and-corporate-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/ZFN7-L8BK]. 
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scholarly compliance with the distinction. We might also examine, for example, how 
compliance has changed over time or varies by subject matter.  
CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars should strive to make precise, insightful claims with rigorous 
support. They should more clearly explain whether their claims are descriptive or 
normative and the extent to which their claims depend on matters of fact as opposed 
to matters of value.  
High quality normative arguments are hard to make, but philosophers have been 
studying them for centuries. Legal scholars can learn from their analytical approach. 
True, the difficulty of making high-quality moral claims may lead some to question 
whether morality is up to the task. But if you don’t think it’s up to the task, then it’s 
hard to know what the endeavor of morally normative scholarship is all about. For if 
moral claims lack a solid foundation, they are little more than opinions, and what 
could make normative legal scholarship less practical than that? On a more optimistic 
note, a focus on rigor can enliven legal scholarship. By being more precise, we can 
hope to stop talking past each other and develop more objective criteria for evaluating 
both scholarship and public policy proposals more generally.  
Judges and the media sometimes rely on legal scholars for objective analysis of 
important issues. Scholars can, indeed, develop expertise about current doctrine, 
judicial decision-making, litigation tactics, and much more. But legal scholars are 
not moral authorities. Their views on matters of value are only as good as their 
arguments. When legal scholars more clearly distinguish facts and values, they will 
better earn the trust of the judiciary and the media, and their pronouncements will 
warrant the practical import many think they already have. 
